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I
HE USE OF CURRENCY intransactions is a
regular part of our dailylives and a basic feature
of our economic system. The importance of
currency derives both fromits obvious role in
daily transactions and from the somewhat more
subtle role ofthe currency systemas the basis for
our monetary and financial systems. The currency
system is so fundamental to economic activity that
we tend to give it little thought. Few of us would
have an easy time imagining what alternative
systems might be like or why they mightbe
desirable. Indeed, it seems likelythat mostof us, if
pressed, would offer the opinion that the present
currency system is the only one that is feasible—or
at least, the only one that is desirable.
This article has three purposes. Thefirst is to
define the term “currency” and explainthe special
importance of currency and the currency system
to our economy. The second is to describe the U.S.
currency system—the system that governs the
forms, uses and roles of currency in themodern
United States. This description will be preceded by
a catalog of the forms currency has taken at vari-
ous points in the past, sothat the modern U.S.
system emerges as a setof selections from a menu
of choices provided by history. Thisprocedure is
intended to suggest that alternative menu selec-
tions were possible—that the currency system
which actually evolvedin the United States is not
the only one that could have evolved. The article’s
third and most ambitious purpose is to present a
brief hut comprehensive account of the historical
development of the U.S. currency system. This
account focuses onthe periodbefore and during
the Civil War.1 Its primary goal is toprovide the
reader with historical context that may improve
his understanding ofthe modern currencysystem.
The historical account has a second purpose,
however, The development ofthe U.S. currency
system is often characterized as a process of slow
but steady advancement: older institutions and
practices, having failed to meetthe demands of
their times, were replaced by more efficient
successors. This“gradual progress” characteriza-
tion implies that the modern currency system
meets the needs of oureconomy more efficiently
than could any of the alternatives suggested by
history. The historical account is intended to help
determinewhether this characterization is valid,
andwhether relative efficiency conclusions
should he based on it.
WHAT IS CURRENCY?
One approach to defining currency is tocontrast
it with something whose definition is closely
related, but morefamiliar: money. Most people
have been exposed at some point to an economist’s
definition ofmoney; it usually reads something
like “things thatserve as media of exchange” or
“things that function as means of payment.” While
all currency is money, all money is not currency.
Currency can he defined as money which circu-
1U.S. monetaryhistory from the end ofthe Civil War through
modern times has been chronicled quite extensively, notably
byFriedman and Schwartz (1963). In addition, most of the key
decisions that determined thebasic form of the U.S. currency
system were arguably made before 1865.












example, commodities such as wampum (colored
beads), tobacco, wheat and rice were used as
currency at different places and times,4 Gold and
silver, the “precious metals,” had attractive
properties— portability, malleability and dur-
ability—which ultimately made them the curren-
cies of choice in most early economnies.
lates, or passes from hand to hand. (“Circulation”
was once commonly used as a synonym for
currency.)
Formally, a type of money can be said tocircu- late if it usually passes inexchange from one person toanother without third-party verification.
One easy way to illustrate the difference between circulating and non-circulating money isto contrast dollar bills, which circulate, with checks,
which do not.2 A dollar bill may pass from one
person toanother many times indifferent transac- tions. ‘the only people involved in each transaction
are the buyer and seller. Transactions using
checks require more complex arrangements. Itis unusual for a check, written by one person in payment to another, to be offered in payment to a
third person. Instead, the second person usually
deposits the check in a bank account. Hisbank and
the first person’s bank then conduct a“clearing”
transaction which, if successfully completed, vali-
dates the payment.’
In the modern United States, onlydollar bills
and coins, issued by agencies of the federal
government, fitthe definition of currency. Earlier
in our history (amid that of many other nations) the
number of alternative types ofcurrency was
larger, and included itemsissued by private
organizations. The next section presents a brief catalog of some of the varieties of currencythat
have existed in the past.
WHAT FORMS CAN CURRENCY TAKE?
As the volume oftransactions involving gold and
silver increased, people began to divide these
metals into pieces of readily recognizable size and
shape, called coins. The earliest coin-producing
facilities (mints) seem to have beenprivately oper-
ated.5 In most countries, however, thegovern-
ment eventually tookover coin production.
The rationale behind the government takeover
may well have included the belief that govern-
ment-issued coins would be more uniform, and
more reliable, than their privately issued counter-
parts. Early governments, however, could have
resolved problems of diversity and fraud by
regulating private mints and inspecting private
coins, in essentially the same way that govern-
ments have longregulated and inspectedother
industries.°A more compelling reason for govern-
ment coin monopolies, however, was the desire to
earn revenue from seigniorage—from periodically
shortweighting or debasing the currency.7 Unless
a governmenthad a coinage monopoly, its attempts
to earn substantial revenues from seigniorage
would have been frustrated as the public aban-
doned its coins in favor of those minted by its
private competitors.
The prevalence of government currency
monopolies gave rise to the twin concepts of a
The earliest forms of currency were commodi-
ties (widely traded goods). In colonial America, for
‘Strictly speaking, economiststhink ofthe accounts against
which checks are drawn (the demanddeposits) as money,
ratherthan the checks themselves.
‘Typically, a person who is offered a newly written check in
payment (thesecond party) will ask thecheck-writer (thefirst
party) to present identification and will record information
from the identification presented - The second party will deposit thecheck in his bank account. His bank will “clear” the check by sending it to thebank against which it is drawn, and demandingpayment in cash. The two banks are the
“third parties” which are actually involved in mosttransac-
tions using checks. The clearing transaction is necessary to verify that the check isdrawn on an account that contains sufficient funds, If the check“bounces,” it has failedthe
verification test. Theamount ofthecheck willnot be credited
tothe second party’s account, and he will use the information
• from thecheck-writer’s ID to pursue him forsome alternative
form of payment. [The reasonthesecond party will rarelytry
to pass thecheck along to a third party is that thethird party is
unlikely to accept it, (If you doubt this,try passing such a
“third-partycheck” at yourlocalgrocery store.) A third party
typically has no easy way of obtaining reliable identification
from the (absent) firstparty.]
4For an extended discussion ofthe role of commodity moneyin
the colonies, see Nettels (1934), chapter VIII.
5Feavearyear (1963) describes early English currency as
follows: “At the beginning of theeighth century the currency
consisted ofsmall silvercoins varying in design according to
thefancy of the individualmoneyer.’ (p. 7)
6Adam Smith (177611937) points outthat before coins evolved,
governments often stamped ingots ofprecious metal to certify
their purity (pp. 24-25).
~Acoin is saidto have been “shortweighted” if it is minted
with less than its official metallic weight, but represented as
having exactly that weight. A coin is said to have been
“debased” if it is minted as a mixture of genuine monetary
metal and commonscrap metal, but represented as pure
monetary metal. These fraudulent practices were sometimes
practiced byprivate mints as well. For a discussion of govern-
ment seigniorage motives, see Timberlake (1991),pp. 3-5,
50-5 1.
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national currency and a national monetary unit.
Typically, a government would define a basic
monetary unit as a fixedquantity of gold or silver.
It would then mintcoins in denominations that
were multiples or fractions ofthis unit and were
scaledappropriately in size and weight.
Most nations had an extended period during
which government-issued coins were the only
form ofcurrency. One problem with these pure-
coin currency systems wasthat they had difficulty
handling transactions ofwidely differing scales. If,
for example, coins were denominated sothat a
single coin of moderate weight could be used to
purchase an inexpensive item (say, an apple), then
the coins necessary topurchase an expensive item
(say, a carriage) were necessarily quite heavy. One
common way inwhich governments tried to solve
this problem wasby establishing bimetallic coinage
systems. In these systems coins of low value
contained a relatively inexpensive metal (typically
silver~, while larger-value coins were composed of
a more expensive metal (typically gold). ‘I’he two
types of coins were referred to collectively as
specie.
The U.S. experience with speciecurrency illus-
trates most ofthe concepts just described. ‘the
U.S. Constitution gave Congress the power to
“coin money, and regulate the valuethereof—a
provisionwhich has been universally interpreted
as prohibiting the states either from minting coins
directly or from authorizing private parties to do
so.8 Shortly afterthe Constitution was ratified,
Congressenacted legislation that defined the basic
monetary unit, the dollar, as either a fixed weight
of gold or a (different) fixedweight of silver. The
federal government then opened a mint that
produced dollar coins in accordance with these
definitions. The mint also produced silver “quar-
ters” containing one-fourth the amount of silver in
a silver dollar, five-dollar gold piecescontaining five
times the amount of goldin a gold dollar, and soon.’
The U.S. Mint continued to produce full-bodied gold
coins until the early 1930s, and full-bodied silver
coins until the mid-1960s. (A full-bodied coin con-
tains a quantity of metal whose market value is
equal to the face value of the coin.)
As the magnitude of economic activity increased,
the weight of the gold coinsnecessary for a major
purchase, or even the quantity that a relatively
ivealthy personmight desire to have on hand,
became unmanageably large. Coins also tended to
wear away or havetheir edges clipped. After a
fewyears, coins of the same denomination could
be significantly different in size.bo These problems
madecoins increasingly unsatisfactory, even for
relatively small-scaletransactions.
Bills of Exchange
An obvious solution to the “weight problems” of
the coin currency system was to find or create
lightweight objects that, while not made of coins
themselves, had known values in terms of coins.
Objects like this already existed: they werepromis-
sorynotes—contracts between borrowers and
lenders calling for the repayment offixed sums (in
coin) at fixed future dates.
One special type ofpromissory note, the bill of
exchange, was readily adapted for use as currency.
Bills of exchange grew out of commercial transac-
tions inwhich merchants would arrange to
purchasegoods from other merchants for delivery
at fixed future dates (forexample, in 90 days).
Often the seller could not affordto produce and/or
deliver the goods unless he received immediate
payment, while the buyer was reluctant to pay for
the goodsbefore receiving delivery. One solution
to this problem was an exchange of contracts. The
seller would contract to deliver the goods at the
date in question, while the buyer would contract
to pay the purchase price at the delivery date. ‘the
latter contract tookthe form of a conventional
promissory note.
This exchange of contracts may not seem to
have addressed the seller’s immediate problem: to
obtain the currency needed to finance the produc-
tion and/or transport of his goods. Suppose,
however, that the seller, armed with his promis-
sory note, sought topurchase materials from a
supplier. He could then write out another credit
instrument—a bill of exchange—calling on the
merchant who had issued the promissory note to
pay the supplier the purchase price of the ma-
terials, plus an allowance forinterest, in 90
5US. Constitution, Article I, Section 8. 10For a description ofthe clippingproblem in pre-eighteenth
9See Huntington and Mawhinney (1910), pp. 474-79. Gold century England, see Feavearyear(1963), pp. 5-6, and
dollar coins were not actually minted until 1849- See Macaulay (1877),volume V, pp. 85-93.
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that, if he did not have occasionto pass italong, he
could redeem it when it came due.”
Althoughbills of exchange became an important
adjunct to coin currency, a number of problems
limited their usefulness. Since they were typically
drawn in fairly largedenominations (ofthe sort
appropriate for trade hetween merchants), they
were not well suited for small-scale transactions.
And, as the volume of trade in a given region
increased, it became less and less likely that a
person proffered a bill would be familiar, either
personally or by reputation, with the merchant
against whom it was drawn, Consequently, disho-
nored billsbecame a more serious problem, and
people became hesitant to acceptthem in payment.
A less fundamental, but still annoying, problem
was that whenever a bill changed hands, interest
had to be calculated and deducted from its face
value. ‘this fairly involved calculation required
consideration ofboth the remaining term on the
bill and the market rate of interest.
Bank Notes
Thetransactions problems with bills of exchange
created opportunities for private entrepreneurs to
profit by providing paper currency in more con-
venient forms. Suppose an enterprising merchant
with a good reputation sold small bills of exchange
in return for specie and used the proceeds to buy
large bills with the same maturity dates. ‘the
proceeds of the large bills would then provide a
fund out of which the small bills could be
redeemed. Because small bills were much more
convenient for exchange purposes than large bills,
they were slightly more valuable, per dollar of
face value, to their holders.” As a result, small
bills could be sold at smaller percentage discounts
(lower interest rates) than large bills. It followed
that the total purchase price of the large bills
necessary to cover a given face value of small bills
was smaller than the total sale price of the small
bills. This difference in total prices represented
the merchant’s profits.
days. This process was called drawing a bill; the original goods seller was called the drawerand the issuer of the promissory note the drawee, The
drawee would accept (agree to cover) the bill as
long as its value was less than that of the promis- sory note. He would indicate his acceptance by
endorsing the bill.”
By accepting the bill, the supplier was, in effect,
lending the seller the value of thematerials the
latter had “purchased.” The supplier, however,
usually did not expect to hold the bill until it came
due. Instead, he planned to pass it along to some-
one from whom he wished to purchase goods; this person might pass it along to someone else, and so on, until the bill matured. The last person in the
chain would demand payment from the drawee.
In between, the bill served as paper currency.”
Notice that drawing a bill was analogous to
writing a check, with the drawee of the bill playing the same role as that of a bank on which a
check is drawn. It seems to follow that bills of
exchange should not have circulated, for precisely the same reasons that modern checks do not
circulate. There was a basic difference between a
bill of exchangeand a modern personal check, however. Because no one would accept a bill unless it was endorsed by the relevant drawee, the
question of “bad checks”—checks written by
individuals with insufficient funds—did not arise. Stated differently, an accepted bill was purely a
liability of the drawee; a person offered a bill in
payment did not need to be concerned about the creditworthiness of the drawer.”
It is true that bills were occasionally dishonored by their drawees, just as modern banks occasion-
ally fail.” As long as the bills were drawn against
well-known merchants with established reputa- tions in commerce, however, failures were un- common. Consequently a person who accepted a
bill in payment could be reasonably confident
‘15ee Clough and Cole(1941), pp. 77-78.
“In England, bills of exchange played a prominent role as
means of payment during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; see Feavearyear (1963), pp. 160-62. In several English districts, they retained this role well into the nineteenth century; see Clapham (1944). II, pp. 90-91,97-98,
Viner (1937), p. 123, and Feavearyear(1963), p. 165. “It is worth notingthat while it is usually difficult to negotiate a third-party check drawn on an individual’s bank account, a
check drawn on theaccount of a government agency or
prominent local corporation may be easy to negotiate.
“The existence offederal deposit insurance prevents small-
scale personal depositors from being endangered by bank
failures, Before 1935, however, this was not true,
“Contemporary criminals sometimes forged merchants’
acceptances, just as moderncriminals sometimesforge
checks,The severity ofpenalties for forgery limited thescale
of this problem, however.
‘5For a careful description ofthe logic behind this statement,
see Wallace (1983).
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The merchant had now become a banker, and
the institution he operated a bank ofissue—a
financial intermediary whose liabilities consisted
primarily of paper currency.’7 The small bills
came to be known as bank notes.
The merchant could increase his profits from
note issue by reducing the risk that he would
default on his notes. This would reduce the “risk
premium” that small billholders demanded, and
enable him to sell the bills at smaller discounts.
One strategy for accomplishing this was to diver-
sify his largebill portfolio as extensively as
possible. Another wasto provide, or to obtain
from investors, some capital to act as a cushion
against defaults on the large bills.
A basic problem with the scheme just described
was that the time and effort necessary to compute
the appropriate discount on a bank note was
usually large relative to the face value of the note.
This reduced the usefulness of notes in transac-
tions and discouraged people from purchasing
them.’8 One way to solve this problem was to issue
notes with characteristics so appealing that their
holders wouldbe willing to forgo interest on
them. How could this be accomplished?
Sincewe have assumed (perhaps too quickly)
that proper diversification and capitalization made
the risk on bank notes negligible, the need for
interest on them arose purely out of their holders’
time preference—their desire to be compensated
for giving up their money (in this case, their specie
currency) for fixed periods. Suppose, however,
that a merchant promised to redeem his notes on
demand (at any time) instead of at a fixed future
date. Since the purchaser of such notes could
reclaim his specie whenever he chose, he would
not be giving it up for any fixed period, and would
have no reason to demand interest, The bills could
then be soldatpar (undiscounted).
How could a merchant make such a convertibility
commitment credible? Clearly, he would need to
hold back some of the (specie) proceeds of his note
sales for use as reserves. These reserves would not
have to be large, however, because as long as note-
holders were confident that they could redeem
their notes, there was no particular reason why
they would do so. After all, the holders had bought
the notes because they were more convenient for
exchange purposes than specie.
Notice that there is some circularity in the argu-
ment just presented. Convertibility, it asserts, was
necessary to prevent noteholders from demanding
compensation for giving up their specie, which
they had been holding for use as money. But these
people had exchanged their specie for notes
precisely because the notes were a more conven-
ient form of money! This paradox makes it seem
possible that convertibility is not really necessary;
indeed, there are both historical and theoretical
reasons for suspecting that it may not be. In prac-
tice, however, the vast majority ofprivate banks
of issue have attached convertibility commitments
to their notes.’° The Bank of England, for example,
began circulating convertible notes shortly after it
received a royal charter in 1695. These notes be-
came the principal paper currency oftherelatively
developed region surrounding London (the
“Metropolis”).” 20
Government Paper Currency
Governments eventuallyacquired a role in the
paper currency systemby regulating the issuance
of private paper currency, and/or by issuing paper
currency directly. The motives for this decision
were essentially the same as those which drove
governments to acquire a monopoly over coinage:
some combination of a desire to improve effi-
ciency by facilitating the development ofuniform
and reliable paper money, and a desire toearn
revenue by regulating or replacing the private
banking system. This revenue has been earned in
a variety of ways. In some cases, governments
have earned substantial sums by granting private
institutions the right to issue paper currency in
return for some kind of financialconsideration.
(See, for example, the discussion of the establish-
ment of the Bank of England which appears
below.) In other cases, revenue has been earned
through direct currency seigniorage, in which the
government issues paper currency to purchase
goods and services, or through indirect seig-
‘7For a description of banks that dealt in bills of exchange, see
Feavearyear (1 963), pp. 162-65.
‘°White(1987) provides an analysis of thetransactions
problems associated with interest-bearing currency.
‘9Calomirisand Kahn (1991) construct a formal model in which
note-or deposit-holders can use redemption demands as a
device forpreventing bank frauding byforcing a preemptive
liquidation. Incomplete information problems make it impos-
sible for these agents todetect fraud without a liquidation.
While this model is not reasonable in every historical context,
it represents a first step toward explaining the prevalence of
convertibility.
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niorage, in which the government issuespaper
currencyto purchase andretire its ownbonds.
Governmentpaper currency cantake a variety
offorms. The earliest form ofgovernment paper
currency—and until quite recently, the most
common form—was representative currency. A
governmentcurrency is said to be “representa-
tive”if it is issued under a convertibility commit-
ment; that is, a government promise to redeem the
currency in specie, at par and on demand. Rep-
resentative currencies are the government-issued
analogues to private, convertible bank notes.
While they have usually beenissued by govern-
ment-organized “central banks,” they have
sometimes beenissued directly by thegovern-
ment. The United States, for instance, had directly
issued representative currency during 1879-1913
(theU.S. notes, or“greenbacks,” which were
issued by the Treasury) and representative
currency issued by a central bank during 1914-1933
(the Federal Reserve notes, which were issued by
the FederalReserve Banks).”
Governments have also issued currency that is
notconvertible into specie, or anything else. This
type ofcurrency is often referred to asfiatcur-
rency.’2 Duringthe CivilWar, both the Union and
the Confederacy issued fiat currency to finance
part of their military purchases. The Union
currency was the greenback mentioned above.
Modern U-S. currency is also fiat innature.
Federal Reserve notes (our dollar bills) have not
been convertible for domestic holders since 1933;
since 1971, theyhave not been convertible for any
holders whatsoever. The Federal Reserve Banks
21Thegreenbacks were first issued in 1863, butwere not
convertibleuntil 1879. Federal Reserve notes were convert-
ible for domestic holdersfrom the establishmentofthe
Federal Reserve System in 1914 until March 1933. They
remained convertiblefor certain foreign holders until 1971,
22A distinction is sometimes made between inconvertible
government currencies that are issued in purchase of assets
(andso form the liabilities sideof a “balanced” balance
sheet), and currencies which are issued in purchase ofgoods
and/or services, Currenciesof theformer type are referred to
as f/duc/ary. Many economists believe that currencies derive
much of their value from theassets which back them.
Descriptionsofthis view appear in Smith (1 985b) and Russell
(1989a). It suggests that fiduciary currencies maybe less
likelytodecline in value (that is, to depreciate) than fiat
currencies,
“Strictly speaking, the Federal Reserve System pays for the
Treasurysecurities it purchases byissuing claims on the
Federal Reserve Banks,These claimscan be redeemedin
currency—Federal Reservenotes—which can be held bythe
general public as cash balances, or bycommercial banks as
reserves, Alternatively, the claimscan be converted into
demand deposits at theFederal ReserveBanks, which can
issue most of these notes inpurchase of U.S.
Treasury securities.’3
WHAT IS A CURRENCY SYSTEM?
A nation’scurrency system can be defined as the
set of laws, conventions and practicesthat deter-
mine the form and role ofcurrency in the nation’s
economy. A complete description of a nation’s
currency system would provide answers toques-
tionslike:“What things doesthe economyof this
nation use as currency?”, “What sorts of institu-
tions (private andlor government) are permitted to
issue currency under the nation’s laws?”, “What
role (if any) does thenation’s government play in
defining the economy’scurrency unit, or inpre-
serving its value?”, and “What is the nature of the
relationship between the nation’s currency system
and its monetary and financial systems?”
HOW DOES THE U.S. CURRENCY
SYSTEM WORK?
This section will provide a brief summary of the
history and legal framework of the U.S. currency
system. It will focus on a pair oflegal restrictions
that play a critical role in shaping the system.
Theserestrictions would be prime candidates for
revision orrepeal if the system were to be reform-
ed or deregulated.
As previously noted, the U.S. Constitution gave
Congress exclusive power to define a national
monetary unit and produce coined currency. In
addition, the stateswere explicitly prohibited
from issuing paper currency directly.” The
also be used by commercial banks asreserves. The decision
concerning how theclaims are divided between these
competing uses is made by the private sector.
At present, currency held by thepublic, or as reserves,
accounts for about 85 percent of total claims on the Federal
Reserve Banks, while U.S. Treasurysecurities account for
about 75 percent oftheirtotal assets, In addition, the
economicimplications of thescheme for paying forthese
securitiesjust described are identical to those of an alterna-
tive scheme under which theSystem paid forTreasury securi-
ties with newly issued Federal Reserve notes, and the private
sectordecided how much ofthis currency toretain andhow
much to deposit withthe Reserve Banks.
The Federal ReserveAct prohibits the System from
purchasing newly issued Treasury securities—an action that
would amount to issuing currency (and/or ReserveBank
deposits) tofinance government purchases. lSee the defini-
tion of“indirect currencyseigniorage” presented earlier in
this section.]
24Article I, Section 10 ofthe U.S.Constitution denies thestates
thepowerto “emit Billsof Credit:” this was almost universally



















SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1991Constitution was silent, however, on twoques-
tions that ultimately became controversial: Does
the federal government have the right to issue
paper currency? Do either the federal govern-
ment orthe states have the right to authorize
private institutions to issue paper currency—do
they have the right, that is, to grant charters to
private banks?
Shortly after the Constitution was ratified, the
states began to charter private banks of issue.” In
1791, and again in 1816, the federal government
chartered a singleprivate bank—the Bankof the
United States. For the next three-quarters of a
century, the bulk ofthe paper currency that circu-
lated in the U.S. was issued by statebanks; virtu-
ally all ofthe remainder was issued by the United
States Bank. The rights ofthe federal government
and the statesto charter private banks were even-
tually affirmed (in separate decisions) by the U.S.
Supreme Court.”
In 1865, Congress imposed a tax on note issue by
state banks that was high enough to make the
activity unprofitable. This action, which came one
year after Congress had established a system of
federally chartered banks of issue called the
National Banking System, was evidently intended
toput an end to state banking.27 Another wartime
innovation was the issuance, beginning in 1862, of
“greenbacks.” For the next 50 years, the U.S. stock
of paper currency consisted almost entirelyof
national bank notes and greenbacks.”
The Civil War produced a dramatic expansion of
the federal government’srole in, and powers over,
the U.S.monetary system. In the years immedi-
ately following thewar, the right of thefederal
government to play this role, and to exercise these
expanded powers, was affirmed in a series of
40
Supreme Court decisions. The war converted a
political system in which the monetary powers of
federal government were sharply circumscribed
into one inwhich theywere virtually unlimited.
Almost half a century later, the federal govern-
ment’s monetary powers were wieldedin dramatic
fashion when Congress passed the Federal Re-
serve Act of 1913. This legislation established 12
“Federal Reserve Banks”that collectively constitu-
ted a “central bank”for the United States.’9The
Reserve Banks issued a new form ofrepresentative
paper currency called“Federal Reserve notes.”
These notes became the basis for the U.S.
currency system.
Duringthe first two decades followingthe
passage ofthe Federal Reserve Act,the national
banks retained the rightto issue limited quantities
of notes. In 1935, however, the national banks’
issue rights expired; Congress declined to renew
them, and made provisions for the gradual retire-
ment ofall national bank notes still outstanding.~0
Since 1935, theFederal Reserve Banks have been
the only U.S. organizations authorized to issue
paper currency on a regular basis.”
The result ofthis historical process can be
summarized as the first of two basic legal restric-
tions which govern the U.S. currency system: the
federal government has a legal monopolyover the
issuanceof currency, whether in coin or paper
form.
The second basic legal restriction involves the
relationship between currency, which is now
exclusivelyfederally issued, and “money” ofother
sorts, which continues to beprovided by the
private sector. Privately issued money is re-
quired to be convertible (redeemable atpar and on
I
“For an exhaustive listof banks chartered by the states prior to
1837, seeFenstermaker(1965).
“Keydecisions upholding the right of the states tocharter
banks are Cra/g v. Missouri(1830) and Br/scoe v. the Bankof
the Commonwealth of Kentucky (1837). Key decisions
regarding the rightof the federalgovernment to charter banks
are McCulloch V. Mary/and(1819) and Farmersand
Mechanics Bank v. Dear/rig (1875).
“State banking survived because it proved possible formany
state banks toconvert topure deposit banking, which was not
taxed prohibitively.
“Theywere eventuallysupplemented by substantial quantities
ofsilvercertificates, andby minorquantities of federal govern-
ment currency ofothersorts. See Friedman and Schwartz
(1963). pp. 124-34, and Timberlake (1978), chapter 10.
“The text ofthe act appears in theAnnual Reportof the
Federal Reserve System for 1914.
“See Friedman and Schwartz (1963), p. 442.
“In principle, Congress retains the right toauthorize the
Treasury toissue paper currency directly. It has declined to
do so, however, since the establishmentof the Federal
Reserve System.
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demand) in government currency.” In practice,
privately issued money consists of deposits at
commercial banks and thrift institutions that are
potentially convenient as media of exchange—i.e.,
that are readily transferable (checkable) and avail-
ablein small denominations. The government
requires that these deposits be convertible, and
they are referred to as “demand deposits.”
If demand deposits are to be convertible into
government currency, they must be denominated
in the same units, and have the same market value
per unit, as government currency. Consequently,
the convertibility restriction, combined with the
government’s currency monopoly, imposes a
common denominational and value standard on all
U.S. money. The denominational standard is of
course the“dollar,” thebasic unit ofgovernment
currency; the value standard is the purchasing
power ofa dollar (orany fixed number of dollars)
of thiscurrency.
It is worth noting that governments usually
attempt to enhance the acceptability of their
currency by making itlegal tender. Legaltender
laws either require or strongly encourage people
to accept government currency in paymentof
nominaldebts—debts denominated in national
currency units. In the United States, both coins
minted by the Treasury and Federal Reserve notes
are legal tender.
HOW DID THE MODERN U.S.
CURRENCY SYSTEM DEVELOP?
Science has been slow to admit the different explan-
awry world ofhistoryinto its domain—andour
interpretations havebeen impoverished by this
omission. Science hasalso fended to denigrate
history, whenforced to a confrontation, by regard-
ing any invocation ofcontingencyas less elegant or
less meanin~ulthan explanations based directly on
timeless “laws of nature.”
—Stephen Jay Gould (t989).
“During the earliest decades of U.S. banking history, the
convertibility requirement was largely implicit. Early in the
nineteenth century, however, states began to pass legislation
which explicitly imposed convertibility on the banks—or,
alternatively, toincludeconvertibility requirements in bank
charters, The federally chartered United States Banks had
convertibility requirements in theircharters, Convertibility
requirements were standard features of state charters issued
under the “Free Banking” laws of 1836-63. The federal
English Origins
Synopsis: The origins ofthe modern U.S. cur-
rency system can be traced in largepart to Eng-
land. Many important features of the U.S. cur-
rency system were based on English models. The
early history of paper currency in England was
dominated by the government’s need for specie
revenues to finance its foreign wars. Thisneed
caused the government to establish two princi-
ples—Bank of England monopoly, and strict specie
convertibility—as the basis for England’s system of
paper currency. ‘these principles had a profound
effect on the evolution of paper currency and
banking in the United Kingdom, and later in the
United States.
In England, the notion of organized note issue
seems to have arisen during the latter part of the
seventeenth century. At the time, England had
had a government-monopoly coin currency
system for several centuries, and had begun to
develop a paper currency system based on bills of
exchange.” Duringthe last decade ofthe seven-
teenth century several groups of entrepreneurs
recognized an opportunity to profit by providing a
more convenient paper currency. Each ofthese
groups sought royal charters for banks of issue.
Horsefield (1960) singles out four groups for
special study. One of them, led by William Paterson,
proposed a bank which would lendconvertible
notes on commercial security. The new bank
was called the Bank of England. It received a
charter in 1695, and has operated continuously
since; it is now the central bank of the United
Kingdom. ‘4
Three other groups, led by Hugh Chamberlen,
John Briscoe, and John Asgill and Nicholas Bar’hon,
respectively, proposed “land banks” which would
lend inconvertible notes on the security of land
and other real property. The land banks of Briscoe
and Asgill-Barhon actually operated for a short
time during 1695-96. In the latter year, they were
consolidated pursuant to a scheme to secure a
royal charter by raising £z,ooo,ooo in specie to he
lent to the British government, which was des-
chartersissued during the late nineteenth century, under the
National BankingAct, also included convertibility
requirements.
~ a description ofearly English monetary history, see Feav-
earyear(1963),chapters l-IV.
‘4The definitive history of the Bank ofEngland has been written





















perate for funds. The charter of this “National
Land Bank” required that it raise half of the
specie loan prior to beginning operation. When
it proved unable to do this, the charter lapsed
and the scheme fell apart.’5
The fear that a public accustomed to coin cur-
rency would not accept inconvertible notes cer-
tainly played a role in the collapse of the Na-
tional Land Bank and other land bank schemes.
Nevertheless, even Horsefield (1960), who is
generally unsympathetic to the concept of land
banking, points out that “the major cause of
these events was an accident of time.” The
Bank of England, which had obtained its charter
by means of a similar commitment to provide
specie, had drained the capital market of funds.
This problem was exacerbated by the onset
of a commercial crisis, which forced the Bank
of England to suspend specie convertibility of
its notes.”
In 1697 the Bank of England obtained, in
return for a further extension of credit to the
government, a formal commitment that Parlia-
ment would authorize no other banks so long
as the Bank existed. Its urgent desire for this
commitment suggests that it continued to
regard land banking as a viable competitive
threat. Clapham (1944) writes that “the General
Court [the directors of the Bank of England]
wanted no more Land Banks.”38 In 1708, in
return for further loan commitments, the mo-
nopoly grant was “reenacted and made more
precise.” Parliament explicitly prohibited any
firm consisting of more than six partners from
issuing notes in England.” ‘thereafter English
note issue was dominated by the Bank of En-
gland. The small “country banks’ operated in
“See Horsefield (1960),chapters 14-16, and Clapham (1944),
volume I, pp. 33-34.
“Horsefield (1960), p. 246.
“Ibid., pp. 246-47.
“Clapham (1944), vol.1, p.47.
“See Clapham (1944), p. 65, and Feavearyear (1963), pp. 167-68.
40During 1797-1821 (the era of the Napoleonic Wars), the Bank
of England suspended specie payments. Although its notes
were not officially legal tender, they became so operationally.
Specie virtually disappearedfrom circulation, most payments
were made in Bankof England notes, and other English
banks redeemed theirnotes in Bankof England notes. See
Feavearyear(1963), pp. 182-85, and Viner(1937), p.l54.
41Macaulay (1 B77) provides a colorful and illuminating para-
graph describing this relationship (IV, pp. 551-2).
4’Clapham (1944), describing the Bank’s firstsummer,
observesthat “what the government—like the Bank—most
its shadow, and evolved along strictly convertible
lines.~°
The development of the British currency sys-
tem can be properly understood only in the
context of the symbiotic relationship between
the British government and the Bank of En-
gland.41 The Bank regarded its paper currency
monopoly as critical to its profitability, and was
willing to make large financial concessions to
the British government in order to protect and
extend it. The British government, on the other
hand, was willing to grant the Bank a monopoly
because it needed the Bank’s financial assist-
ance—in particular, to help it obtain specie to
finance foreign wars.4’ Under the circum-
stances, it was profoundly in the interest of
both parties for government liabilities to be
identified as closely as possible with Bank liabili-
ties, and for Bank liabilities to be identified as
closely as possible with specie.~’The simplest
and most certain way to achieve this was for
the Bank to lend extensively to the government
and make its notes strictly convertible.’~
In Scotland the situation was quite different.
The convertible, commercial Bank of Scotland
was chartered by the Scottish Parliament in
1695. This bank, unlike the Bank of England,
was statutorily uninvolved in government
finance. It was granted a 21-year note issue mo-
nopoly (which was not renewed). In 1705, both
Hugh Chamberlen, who had now moved to
Scotland, and John Law, who was later to
achieve monetary infamy in France, proposed
land banks for Scotland. Both proposals were
rejected because they involved notes that were
legal tender—a status Parliament was unwilling
wanted in the summer of 1696 was not a circulationof notes
but cash, hard cash forthe Armyin Flanders” (vol. I, p. 39).
4’Clapham (1944) points out that under the Act of 1697, which
formalizedthe Bank’s monopoly, “forgery ofthe Bank’s notes
was to be punished with death, the penalty forclipping or
coining theKing’s money. Bank notes were not yet the King’s
money, but they were getting near toit.” (vol. 1, p. 50). In
October of 1698, he writes, theEnglish Treasury agreed to
“‘receivesuch bills oftheBank of England commonly called
Bank Bills ... provided the said bills are notatanydiscount.’
The time was getting nearer when the Bank would circulate
theExchequer Bills for the Treasury, cash them on demand,
accept them asdeposits, make generous advances on their
security, and even pay a dividend on them.” (vol.1, p.56; my
emphasis). And in 1710, iust two years after it had acted to
furtherstrengthen the Bank’s monopoly status, the British
Parliament passed an Act” ‘for engaging and obliging the
Bankof England .-. toexchange all Exchequer bills forready
money on demand.’ “(vol.1, p.67).
‘4Santoni (1984) asserts that “the Bank’s contract with its
customers to redeem its notes at a fixed price in termsof gold
I
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was a voluntary arrangement” (p. 15). He justifies this asser-
tion by noting that the gold standard was not imposed by
British law until 1821, morethan a centuryafter the Bank was
founded. While this is certainly true, it is also true that until
theearly nineteenth century much of British bank regulation
was implicitrather thanexplicit. One illustrative example
involves the monopoly status of the Bank ofEngland. Most
historians describe theBank as having possessed a
monopoly overjoint-stock (corporate) banking in England.
However, theAct of 1708 gave it a monopoly onlyover joint-
stock note issue. Nevertheless, none ofthedeposit banks in
England attempted to organize in corporate form. Feav-
earyear (1963) explains this by notingthat, despite the lack of
an explicitlegal prohibition against joint-stock deposit
banking, “there can be no question whatever that theinten-
tion was to givethe Bankof England a monopoly ofjoint-stock
banking, and that had any other institution of morethan six
partners attempted to carry on banking in England in any
mannerwhatever atany time during the first halfofthe
century it would have been suppressed” (pp. 167-68). Simi-
larly, despite thelack of an explicit legal requirement that
bank notes be convertible, there can be little question but that
the intention was that they should be convertible, and that
any attempts bytheBank ofEngland, or any oftheEnglish
country banks, to issue inconvertibleor semiconvertible
notes would have been suppressed—just as attempts ofthis
sort byScottish banks were suppressed (see below).
Santoni also asserts that theestablishment of an official
gold standard occurred as a result of“the Bank’s continuous
prodsto an unwilling government.” He justifies this assertion
by noting (1) that thedeadlines set by Parliament for resump-
tion were repeatedly postponed, and (2) that the Bank
resumed paying specie for small notes in 1817, and Parlia-
ment intervened in 1819 to prohibit it from doing so. However,
Viner (1937), Clapham (1944), and Feavearyear all reportthat
the government’s primary goal in postponing resumption was to
avoid embarrassing the Bank. IViner writes that “the govern-
ment continued to refuse to obligate the Bank of England to
resume cash payments, and both government and Bank were
obviously waiting for the course of events to disclose the auspi-
cious occasion for resumption” (p. 172, my emphasis); Feav-
earyear notes that “the Government refused to allow the Bank’s
hand to be forced, and repeatedly extended the term of the
Restriction Act” (p. 214).] These authors also describe the
resumption attempt citedby Santoni as a failure, and the
government prohibition as an attempt to protect the Bank.
Finally, both Clapham (1944, vol.2, p. 70) and Feavearyear (pp.
221-22) reportthat the Bank opposed the legislation which actu-
allycompelled it to resume specie payments.
45For a history of theearly years of Scottish banking, see
Checkland (1975) or White (1984). For a description ofthe
Scottish land bankproposals and theirfate, see Horsefield
(1960),pp. 175-78, 215-16.
46The option clause has attracted a good deal of academic
attention in recent years. See White (1984), pp. 25-30,
141-42, Rockoff (1986) and Dowd (1988),for example.
475ee Checkland (1975), pp. 118-21; White (1984), pp. 29-30.
The legislation originally proposedruled out theoption clause
only; itwas lateramended to rule outany notes not redee-
mable on demand.
to grant private liabilities.~’Apparently, the
failure of the English land bank schemes had
created a belief that inconvertible notes would
be accepted only if they were legal tender. As
we shall see, this belief was also widespread in
the American colonies—where experience ulti-
mately refuted it.
During the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, Scottish banking was considerably
more competitive than English banking. The
major banks fought bitter “note duels,” present-
ing their competitors’ notes for payment in an
effort to drain their specie reserves and force
them to retrench. One defensive response to
these duels was the issuance by Scottish banks
of notes which contained an “option clause—a
clause that granted them the right to defer
specie payments for a fixed period in return for
legal interest.~°
Experiments like the option clause might well
have led to further departures from convertibili-
ty in Scotland, where both the public and the
government were more comfortable with banks
and paper currency than their counterparts in
England. During the financially troubled years
of the early I760s, however, the option clause
and other “irregular” Scottish banking practices
attracted unfavorable attention in England
(whose Parliament had absorbed that of Scot-
land in 1707). ln 1765 the British Parliament
stepped in with an act prohibiting notes con-
taining an option clause, or any other depar-
tures from strict convertibility.~’
Colonial Origins
Synopsis: The American colonies experimented
with a variety of currency systems based on
inconvertible notes issued by colonial govern-
ments. During the early eighteenth century the
British government began to regulate these sys-
tems. British regulation forced some of the col-
onies to hack their notes more carefully, and
eventually prevented all the colonies from mak-
ing their notes legal tender. By the end of the
colonial period many of the colonies had deve-
loped successful and popular currency systems.
These systems were based on inconvertible
notes which were carefully hacked, and were
not legal tender.
Conditions in early colonial America dif-
fered from those in England even more
profoundly than did conditions in Scotland. In
the colonies, the most pressing monetary
problem was a specie shortage: the quantity
of specie the colonists were able to retain




















needs for a medium of exchange.~’During the
lGSOs, the Massachusetts Bay Colony attempted
to allay the shortage by operating its own mint
(which produced the renowned “Pine Tree Shill-
ings”). The British government viewed this ac-
tion as usurping a royal prerogative, however,
and forced Massachusetts to close the mint.~’
The colonies also experimented with commodity
currencies of different types; these included
wampum (Indian beads), rice and tobacco.’°
Despite the public’s need for more convenient
means of payment, the introduction of a new
form of government paper currency was moti-
vated in the first instance by the fiscal exigen-
cies of a colonial government. In 1696, the
Massachusetts legislature experienced great
difficulty financing an expedition against the
French in Canada. It decided to issue “bills of
credit” in the form of paper currency to use to
purchase supplies. These bills were neither con-
vertible nor ultimately redeemable in specie;
they could, however, be used to defray future
tax liabilities. This financing expedient proved
quite successful, and the colony used it repeat-
edly during the ensuing 50 years. Within a very
few years, other colonies began to adopt the
practice—first in New England, and later else-
where. By 1730 or so, bills of credit had become
the principal currency of the American colonies.”
The earliest colonial bills were issued, like
these Massachusetts bills, in anticipation of fu-
ture taxes. After a few years, however, certain
colonies began experimenting with bills that
were issued on loan. Typically the issuing colo-
ny would pass laws providing that relatively
small sums in new bills could be lent to individ-
uals who were able to provide land or other
sorts of property as collateral. (Often these
loans were mortgage loans and were intended
in part to encourage the colonists to settle and
improve land.) These “loan office” or “land bank”
issues became increasingly popular during the
first half of the eighteenth century.”
As previously indicated, the legislation auth-
orizing the emission of tax anticipation or loan
office bills was typically accompanied by legisla-
tion providing for their eventual retirement—
either by imposing future taxes which the bills
could be used to pay, or setting out the terms
according to which the loans would be secured
and repaid. The legislators clearly believed that
it was these retirement commitments that con-
veyed value to the bills.” Unfortunately, there
were often great political and financial incen-
tives for the colonies to violate these commit-
ments by declining to levy or collect the future
taxes, by declining to collect the loan payments,
or by stretching out the period over which loans
could be repaid. When these things happened,
the bills would often depreciate in value relative
to specie and goods.’~The extent of the depreci-
ation was typically measured by the discount on
paper currency relative to specie currency; that
is, by the difference, in percent, between unity
(one) and a fraction equal to a given quantity of
specie currency divided by the quantity of
paper currency it could be sold for in the open
market. If it took 50 shillings in paper currency
to purchase 40 shillings in specie currency, for
instance, then the discount on paper currency
was 20 percent. During the early decades of the
eighteenth century, many colonial currencies ex-
perienced significant depreciation. In some cases,
the depreciation was quite severe.55
Currency depreciation became particularly con-
troversial because most colonies gave their bills
of credit the status of legal tender. Legal tender
laws compelled creditors to accept bills at face
value in payment of debts. If, for example, a loan
agreement called for a repayment of 500 shillings
at the end of five years, the lender could be
forced to accept 500 shillings in bills of credit,
48For discussions ofthe specie shortage, seeNettels (1934),
pp. 202-207, and Brook (1975), pp. 1-9.
49See Felt (1839), Bullock (1900),Chapter III, Breckinridge
(1903), pp. 55-56 and Nettels (1934). p. 276.
‘°None of these experiments proved particularlysatisfactory.
For a descriptionofcolonial experiments with commodity
currency see Nettels (1934),chapter VIII, and Brock (1975),
pp. 9-16.
“For an encyclopedic account ofcolonial currency history prior
to 1764, seeBrook (1975).
‘2Fordiscussions of colonial land banking, see Davis (1900),
Kemmerer (1939),Thayer (1953), Billias (1959), Brook (1975)
and Smith (1984), among others.
5’Nettels (1934) writes that “In the opinion ofthecolonists, the
principal factor affecting the specie value of theirpaper was
the provision made for redeeming it from tax revenues”
(pp. 257-58).
‘4For analyses of the linkbetween backing and depreciation,
see Smith (1984, 1985a, l9BSb) and Russell (1988).
55Data on thespecie prices of the currencies ofvarious
different colonies are presented by Brook (1975) and Smith
(1984, 1985a, 1985b), among others.
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even though he might prefer specie. The pen-
alties for refusing to accept bills were relatively
harsh: the creditor might forfeit the entire
amount of the debt or, in some cases, a multiple
thereof.”
The original idea behind legal tender laws was
to protect borrowers, and to reduce the fre-
quency of lawsuits, by providing a method of
repayment which was beyond legal challenge.’~
When unexpected depreciation occured, how-
ever, legal tender laws tended to benefit debtofs
(by reducing the real value of their obligations)
at creditors’ expense. This made them popular
with farmers and other debtors, and unpopular
with creditor interests.
The creditor interests included a number of
British merchants who did business with the
colonies. Many of these merchants were well-
connected in Great Britain; their complaints,
which were seconded by those of indigenous
merchants and creditors, received sympathetic
attention from the British colonial administration,
and eventually from the British Parliament. After
1730, the colonial administration began to issue
regulations eliminating or restricting the right of
particular colonies to issue new bills or (more fre-
quently) to make them legal tender. As the prob-
lem of depreciation worsened, however, Parlia-
ment considered comprehensive legislation. The
Currency Act of 1751 deprived the New England
colonies of the right to issue legal tender bills and
greatly restricted their powers to issue paper cur-
rency of any description. In 1764, a second Cur-
rency Act extended the legal tender prohibition
to all the colonies.”
“See Bullock (1900), p. 131, Nettels, (1934), p.265, and
Russell (1988), pp. 47-48.
‘7SeeBreckinridge (1903), p. 52, and Hurst (1973), p. 40. West
(1978) stressesthe role of colonialpaper currency in
providing a “means ofsettlement,” but does not mention
legal tender laws explicitly.
“Even before theblanket legal tenderprohibition, the British
government had intervened to prevent particular colonies
from making their currencies legal tender. It alsointervened
to force some of thecolonies to back their legal tender curren-
cies morecarefully with future tax receipts, and to prevent
othersfrom issuing currency on loan. See Davis (1900, vol. I
and II),Ferguson (1953), Ernst (1973),Brook (1975), Smith
(1984,1 985b) and Russell (1988).
For thehistory of the Currency Acts, see Davis (1900),
Greene and Jellison (1961), Ernst (1973), Brook (1975), Smith
(1985) and Russell (1988).
“In 1767, Ben Franklin wrote that “On the whole, no method
has hitherto been formed toestablish a medium of trade, in
lieu of money, equal, in all its advantages, to bills of credit,
funded on sufficient taxes for discharging it, or on land secu-
rity .-. and in the mean time made a GENERAL LEGAL
TENDER.”lFranklin (1971), p. 354; his emphasis.]Ferguson
Many colonies responded to the legal tender
prohibitions by issuing non-legal tender bills of
credit. Although many contemporary analysts be-
lieved that giving the bills legal tender status was
essential to preserve their value, this does not
seem to have been the case in practice.” The
non-tender bills remained quite stable in value—
far more stable, in many cases, than their legal
tender predecessors. This was particularly strik-
ing because many non-tender issues took the
form of land banks—a mode of issue the British
regarded as particularly prone to depreciation.’°
During the decade prior to the Revolution, the
colonies appeared to be moving toward a system
of non-legal tender land bank currency.”
Revolution and Reorganization
Synopsis: The Revolution completely disrupted
the evolution of the American currency system.
The Continental Congress was forced to finance
wartime expenditures by money creation—a policy
which led to a virtual hyperinflation. ‘The war,
and the depression that followed it, produced
financial problems for both state governments
and the general public. One symptom of these
problems was large public and private debts—
many of which were held by the domestic prop-
ertied classes. This situation, combined with mem-
ories of the recent inflation, created fears among
the members of these classes that popularly
elected state governments would adopt monetary
policies designed to partially repudiate these debts.
Representatives of the propertied classes domi-
nated the Constitutional convention. They moved
(1953) writes that “The restraining act of 1764 ... prohibited
legal tenderlaws and required that existing legal tender
currencies be sunk at theirexpiration dates. Many colonies
protested, in thebelief that the legal tender feature wasan
essential prop to their currency. Experience was to show,
however, that therestriction did not materially impairthe
workings of the currency system” (p. 177).
seFordiscussions ofthestrong performance of nontender
paper currency, see Ernst (1973), Smith (1 984b) and Russell
(1988),
“See Ferguson (1953), pp. 177-180. Inconvertible government
currency which was notlegal tender isofspecial historical
interest because it was issued under circumstances that
approximated relatively closely thecircumstances under
which inconvertible private currency might have been issued.
This was especially true when, aswas frequently thecase,
thecurrency was issued on loan rather than in anticipation of
taxes. Russell (1988) arguesthat the successof government,
non-legal-tender, inconvertible land banking before theRevo-
lution provides indirect evidence that private inconvertible




















toprevent repudiation by prohibiting the states
from issuing theirown currency, or from making
privately issued currency legal tender.
During the Revolutionary War, the Continental
Congress was the American central government,
and bore primary responsibility for conducting
and coordinating the war effort. It also faced a
critical financing problem: underthe Articles of
Confederation, it lacked the power to levy taxes.
(Colonial opposition to British taxation had been
one of the most important causes of the rebellion.)
During the early stages of the Revolutionary War,
the Congress attempted to subsist on voluntary
contributions from the colonies. When this source
of revenue proved insufficient, it began to issue
bills of credit—the renowned “continentals”—
which were backed by little more than the pious
hope that the states would eventually provide
funds, or authorize tax levies, to retire them. The
likelihood ofsuch retirements became ever more
distant as the quantity of continentals increased
and the states supplemented them with their own
currency issues. Both forms of paper currency
beganto depreciate—at first gradually, and later
very rapidly. By the end ofthe war, they were
virtually worthless.”
During the brief“critical period” between the
end of the war (in 1783) and the tatification of the
U.S. Constitution (in 1789), the newly independent
states beganto reorganize their finances and con-
sider the problem of providing a paper currency.
A number of states issued or seriously considered
issuing hills of credit in anticipation of taxes or on
loan—much in the manner ofthe prerevolutionary
colonies.”
Unfortunately, the continental hyperinflation
had fractured the prerevolutionary consensus
regarding the usefulness of paper currency.
People who had accepted continentals or contin-
ental-denominated securities from government or
private parties were outraged that the states ap-
peared to have no intention of redeeming them at
anything close to the values at which theyhad
traded during the early years of the war. Indeed,
the propertied classes cametoviewpaper currency
as a device by which popularly elected govern-
ments sought to permit the common people to
escapethe burden of their public and private
debts. (The lengthy trade depression that followed
the end of thewar had increased private debt
burdens.) Wealthy Americans became terrified
that the state legislatures, which wet-c now free
from Britishrestraint, would reprise the Revolu-
tionary experience by issuing large volumes of
inadequately backed legal tender bills—bills which
would rapidly depreciate, and which could be
used to retire debts at a fraction of theirrealvalue.
As a result, proposals to issue paper currency that
would have received consensus support before
the Revolution now became the subjects of intense
political controversy.’4
In Rhode Island, radical populists gained control
of the legislature. They confirmed the worst fears
of theanti-paper money conservatives by issuinga
legal tender currency, and then engineering a
rapid inflation that seemed clearly designed to
enable borrowers to escape their debts.” In
Massachusetts, an agrarian insurrection (Shay’s
Rebellion) erupted as a result of the refusal of the
legislature to issue legal tender paper currency.”
As it happened, theConstitution was written
and ratified during a period of conservative
ascendancy— a reaction against excesses of the
sort epitomized by events in Massachusetts and
Rhode Island.” The conservatives desired a “hard”
cutrency immune from depreciation. As a result,
the framers ofthe Constitution were not content
merely todeprive the states of the right to issue
legal tendet bills; instead, they were prohibited
from issuing currency of any kind. Specie was
established as the new nation’s sole legal tender
currency—and, in the minds of many, as the
nation’s only legitimate currency.
“For a good account of the history of theContinentals, and
indeed of Revolutionary War finance, see Ferguson (1961).
See also Calomiris (1988).
“For general discussions of currency issues by(incipient)
statesduring the critical period, see Nevins(1924), Ferguson
(1961), Nettels (1962), Russell (1988) and Schweitzer (1989).
‘4Fordescriptions of public attitudes toward paper currency
during thecritical period, see Libby (1894), Hammond (1957)
and Ferguson (1961).
“Most of the other colonies that issued legal tender bills also
experienced serious depreciation—though not on the scale of
Rhode Island, Onthe other hand, colonies that issued
nontender billsexperienced little or no depreciation. For a
discussion ofthis question,see Russell (1988). For descrtp-
tions of Rhode Island’spost-revolutionary currency policy, see
Phillips (1865), Bates (1898), Nevins(1924) and Ferguson
(1961).
“The classic study of Shay’s Rebellion is Taylor (1954).
“This point is made by Ferguson (1961), pp. 249-250, Nevins
(1924), p. 537, and Schweitzer (1989),pp. 319-320.
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Thus the peculiar historical circumstances of
the post-revolutionary critical period had a pro-
found and lasting impact on the nature of the U.S.
monetary system. The trauma of the Revolution
made the currency system controversial, and ulti-
mately produced a system verydifferent from the
relatively uncontroversial system of late colonial
times. Indeed, it seems likely that had the colonies
been able to escape British domination without
fighting an expensive war, or had theprincipal
casusbe//urn not been one which required that the
war be financed by means which sowedthe seeds
of a divisive struggle between classes, the United
States might have begun its existencewith a decen-
tralized currency system based on (non-legal tend-
er?) bills of credit issued by state governments.”
The Constitution was silent on the question of
privately issued currency. Indeed, dum-ingthe
years immediately following its ratification, issu-
ance of small-denomination liabilitieswhich might
circulate as currency (which might “pass current,”
to use the contemporary phrase) was regarded as
a right of all free persons. By the second decade of
the nineteenth century, however, thelegislatures
ofmost ofthe states had acted to eliminate or
greatlyrestrict thatright.” There were at least two
reasons for this. One was the problems caused by
irresponsible, or downright fraudulent, private
issues. Another, which was perhaps more compel-
ling, was the desire of the state legislatures to re-
serve the right ofnote issue to state-chartered
banks -
The Constitution had also been silent regarding
the right of the states (or thefederal government)
tocharterhanks ofissue—perhaps because private
banking had little history in the colonies. In
Massachusetts, the mosteconomically sophisti-
cated colony, efforts to organize a private land
“Many historians believe that resentment over British efforts to
regulate colonialcurrency practices played a major role in
stimulating the Revolution. [SeeBullock (1900), pp. 56-59,
Davis (1900), vol.1, chapter XXI, vol.2, pp. 256-61,Brock
(1975), pp. 561-63, Billias (1959), p.42, and Ernst (1973), pp.
359-60, forexample.] This makes it seem very ironic that the
currency restrictionsthe U.S. Constitution imposed on the
states were generally more restrictive than any the British had
ever imposed. [One exception is that thestates could charter
private banks of issue, something the British had prohibited
thecolonies from doing. It is not completelyclear that the
framers actuallyintended to authorize state-chartered
banking, however (see below).l
“See Hammond (1957), pp. 27-29, 184-85 and Fenstermaker
(1965a), pp. 21-22.
“Both these motives are mentioned byHammond (1957), pp.
27-29, 159-60, 184-85. See also Fenstermaker (1965a), pp.
bank along the lines of public land banks began
late in the seventeenth century and persisted
episodically forthe next five decades. The mercan-
tile community was somewhat skeptical of land
banking, however, since it threatened to compete
with their own lending activities. [Merchants in
the coastal cities provided a good deal of trade
creditto themerchants and farmers of theinterior.]
In addition, the colonial authorities (both adminis-
trative and legislative) were reluctant to giveup
their monopoly over paper currency—partly out
of fearthat a formof money issued outside of offi-
cial control mightbe subject to manipulation, and
partly out of concern that it might reduce poten-
tial revenuesfrom seigniorage. Although various
private land bank projects received considerable
popular support, they were unable to surmount
this political opposition.”
By 1740, however, therestrictions on colonial
issues which had been imposed by the British
government had become soonerous (land bank
issues, in particular, had been entirely pmohibited)
that the Massachusetts legislature was willing to
charter a private land bank. While the land bank
project received broad support from the public, it
was vehementlyopposed by the colony’s governor
(acreature ofthe British), who viewed it as weak-
ening the mother country’s control over the colony’s
economy. The land bank was also opposed by
British merchants, who saw it as a threat to their
near monopoly over trade credit. Both groups ap-
pealed for relief to Parliament, which responded by
enacting legislation prohibiting the establishment
of banking corporations anywhere in the colonies)”
The legislatures of the newly independent states
saw chartered banking as a means by which they
could provide their citizens with paper currency
while at the same time (in many cases) providing
15-16. Theimportanceof the latter motive is indicated by
Hammond’s comment that restrictions on unincorporated
note issue were enacted “on thecomplaint of chartered
banks” (p. 184).
‘1ln 1714 there was a well-organized and determined attempt to
organize a private land bank—an attempt which was
supported bysome influential British merchants, and
received the endorsement ofthe Board ofTrade. The govern-
ment of Massachusetts responded byestablishing a public
land bank. See Billias (1959), pp. 3-5, Nettels (1934), pp.
271-275, Davis (1900),volume I, pp. 56-61,volume II, pp.
82-91, Ernst (1973), pp. 27-28, and Metz (1945), chapters 3,4.
“See Billias (1959), Davis (1900),volume II, pp.130-261,
Hammond (1957), pp. 24-25. Brock (1975), pp. 123-27, Ernst





















themselves with revenue. Of course bank charters
would be more valuable to their holders, and thus
issuing charters would be more lucrative for the
states, if the charters conveyed an e,vclusive right to
issue paper currency. This accounts for the prohi-
bitions against private issues from other sources.”
But what sort of banks should the states charter?
While it might seem that the colonies’ extensive
experience with public land banks should have led
them, as states, tocharter private land banks, they
did not in fact do so. Two factors may help explain
this situation. The first is that the right of the states
tocharter banks of any sort was not altogether
clear; indeed, the view that they did not have this
right was widely held.’~ Doubts about state charter
rights seem to have existed on two levels. Many,
and perhaps most, informed Americans believed
that the Constitution established specie as the only
legitimate form of “money.” The question then
became “What is ‘money’?” and, in particular, “Are
hank notes ‘money?” A conservative viewwas that
the categom’y “money” did include bank notes, and
indeed paper bills of all descriptions, so that paper
currencyin any form was proscribed. A more
moderate view was that bank notes convertiblein
speciewere not money, hut merely its “representa-
tive,”and thus were not constitutionally prohibi-
ted.” ‘T’his view implied that private landbanking
conducted along colonial lines, which is to say
through the issuance ofinconvertible notes, in-
volved direct creation of money, and was there-
fore unconstitutional—even ifthe bills were not
legal tender.”
A second possible reason why the states did not
opt for some form of land banking was that, given
their British-imposed lack of experience with
private banking, their only models for bank
charters were those of British banks—which
meant, for all intents and purposes, the charter of
the Bank of England. Indeed, the charters of many
of the earliest state banks were virtual carbon
copies of the Bank of England’s charter. The
attractiveness of the British model may have been
enhanced when, shortly after the Constitution
was ratified, the Federal government decided to
seek a charter for a single “National Bank” along
the lines of the Bank ofEngland. This institution
was calledthe “Bank of the United States,” and
was established in 1791 with a 20-year charter.
‘rhough the U.S. Bank was basicallya private
organization, the Feder’al government held a
minority interest, and the Bank was expected to
provide a variety of financial services for the
government in addition to its private lending
activities.” The early state banks seem to have
been intended as state versions of the U.S. Bank.
This is reflected in the fact that until the charter of
the U.S. Bank expired in 1811, most states char-
tered justone or, at most, a handful ofbanks.”
The failure of the first U.S. Bank to secure a new
chartet was due to a combination of doubts about
its constitutionality, suspicion of its power, and
discomfort with the fact that much of its stock
was foreign-owned.” The demise of the bank
coincided with a period of national economic
expansion associated partly with the impact of
the Napoleonic Wars on commodity prices, and
partly with the settlement of the western
(trans-Appalachian) region. Across the United
States, and particularly in the new statesand
“The motives (and actions) ofthestates in this regard were
similar to those of any license-granting monopolist. The
strategy was evidently based on theBritish example. During
the eighteenth century, theBritish government had repeat-
edly extracted largepayments. or loans on favorable terms,
fromthe Bankof England in return for extending or strength-
ening its monopoly on note issue- A distinctively American
variant ofthis strategy was for a state government to require a
bank’s organizers to cedethestate an equity interest in
return for grantingthe bank a charter. Sometimes the interest
was cededgratis, and sometimesmerely on favorable terms.
This practice was particularlycommon in the southeastern
states. In several of these states bank dividends accounted
for a substantial portion of state government revenues. [See
Fenstermaker (1965a), pp. 17-20. For a thorough analysisof
the importance of dividends from bank stock in state govern-
ment finance during this period,see Sylla, Legler and Wallis
(1987).]
‘4For a general description of the nature and source of doubts
aboutthe constitutionalityof state banks see Hammond
(1957), pp. 103-13, 564-71,and Hurst (1973), pp. 11-12,
141 -45.
“See Hammond (1957), pp.61,105-06, Gallatin (1879), pp.
254-55, (1879), p. 379, Bancroft(1831), p.40.
“The relatively radical view that private or even public land
banking was consistent with the Constitution, so long as the
states did not try to make thenotes of such institutionslegal
tender (oreven, perhaps. if they did), did not become popular
until theeconomically troubled period following the Panic of
1819.
“Forthe history ofthe first U.S. Bank, see Holdsworth (1910).
“For information concerning state banks chartered before
1819, see Fenstermaker (1965b).
“See Hammond (1957), pp. 209-26, and Holdsworth (1910).
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territoriesofthe West and South, banks were
chartered in large numbers.” These newbanks
differed from the established banks in one crit-
icalrespect: they were organized primarily to
provide credit to farmers.”
Economic Depression and Its
Consequences
Synopsis: The lengthy and severe depression
that followed the Panic of 1819 placed great strains
on the U.S. banking and currency system. The
crisis exposedabasicinconsistency between two
goals of the developing banking system: specie
convertibility of bank currency, on one hand, and
liberal extension of farm credit, on the other.
Many of the southern and western states, in which
farmerspredominated, responded by experi-
menting with systems in which banks issued in-
convertible notes. While some of these systems
were clearly not viable, others appear to have
had promise. The federally chartered Bank of the
United States intervened to put an end to all of
them, however.
At this point in U.S. history, aconflict arosebe-
tween the needs of economic development and the
devotion to “hard money” which gi-ew out of the
Revolution. Economists since the time of Adam Smith
had understood that banks which issued convertible
notes, and thus were vulnerable to i-uns, could not
safely lend to farmers: farm loans were typically long
tertn, illiquid and relatively risky.” The need for
farm credit was sufficiently great, and public under-
standing of banking sufficiently slight, however, that
the legislatures of the southern and western states
“At the time, the western region included western Pennsyl-
vania, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, Indiana, Illinois and
Missouri. (The following account applies most closely to
the experience of the last five states listed.) The southern
region included Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia and Alabama. (The following account applies most
closely to the experience of North Carolina, South Carolina
and Georgia.)
For information concerning state banks chartered before
1837 see Fenstermaker (1965a).
“For a discussion of the development of agricultural (and
other types of long-term) banking see Hammond (1934),
Hammond (1957), pp. 676-80, and Redlich (1951), vol. 1,
pp. 11-13, 44-45.
“Many farm loans were seasonal loans to finance planting
or harvesting the crop. Variation in weather conditions and
crop prices could make such loans quite risky, and by
contemporary commercial standards they were relatively
long term. However, a good deal of farm credit involved
much longer-term loans to finance the purchase andlor
clearing of land, the purchase of equipment (and in the
South, slaves), etc. Most loans for these purposes were
“accommodation loans.” An accommodation loan did not
permitted (and indeed encouraged) their banks to
finance large quantities of farm credit by issuing
convertible notes.”
The collapse in agricultural prices which occurred
during 1818-19 (and led tothe Panic of 1819) made
the two mandates of the southern and western
banks—prompt specie redemption of notes, and
liberal extension of farm credit—impossible to recon-
cile.” The price collapse produced widespread loan
defaults and runs on banks. Since agricultural loans
were impossible either to collect or to sell in a short
time, the runs could he stopped only by suspending
speciepayrnents—b~ refusing to redeem bank notes
in specie on demand. Even after the runs subsided,
however, the defaults represented tremendous losses
for the stockholders of banks that wet-c willing, or
could be compelled, to honor their convertibility
commitments. Indeed, a lam’ge numbem’ of western
banks had become insolvent.” The managers of the
southern and western banks responded by declining
to resume payments, and theij notes continued to
ti-ade at substantial discounts in the open mam’ket.
‘I’he holders of these notes were forced, in effect, to
hear some of the financial losses associated with the
l’anic -
The governments of the western and southern
states responded to this situation in very different
ways. Most western states had banking systems
composed of large numbers of relatively small banks.
Since the losses associated with the price collapse
and Panic were particularly heavy in the West, most
western banks were insolvent, or nearly so; their
notes were trading far below pam’. Many westerners
viewed the events of 1818-19 as a conspiracY on the














have a fixed term; the borrower was expected to pay an
“installment” equal to a fixed fraction of the principal (typi-
cally, 10 percent) every 90 days. In practice, installments
could be deferred andlor reduced, so that the lifespan of
an accommodation loan could greatly exceed the term im-
plied by these conditions. Crop loans might also be ex-
tended as accommodation loans, with the presumption
that they would be fully repaid at the end of the season.
Very often adverse circumstances made this impossible,
however. See Fenstermaker (1965a), pp. 47-49, Redlich
(1951), volume I, p. Il, Holder (1937), pp. 119-22, and
Russell (1989a), pp. 69-73.
“See Hammond (1957), pp. 178-83, Redlich (1951), pp.
9-12.
“For descriptions of and data on the price collapse. see
Cole (1938), Berry (1943), Smith (1953) and Russell
(1989c).
“A list of the banks which failed during or shortly after the
Panic can be compiled from information presented by Fen-
stermaker (1965a). Berry (1943) provides information con-





their property. The banks, they believed, had
been agents of this conspiracy. Consequently,
the western legislatures moved to revoke their
charters anchor to force them to liquidate. Pri-
vate banks were replaced by monolithic, state-
managed organizations called “Banks of the State”
or “relief banks.” They were supposed to lend
inconvertible notes which would be given quasi.
legal tender status by their states.”
The history of the relief banks was brief, con-
troversial, and generally undistinguished. Since
their mandate was to lend liberally to financially
distressed farmers, the market value of their
loan portfolios was low relative to the nominal
value of their outstanding notes. This circum-
stance was reflected in the deep discounts on
the notes.” The lending standards of the tllinois
relief bank were so lax, and its efforts at collec-
tion so ineffectual, that its notes soon became
virtually worthless.”
Both the legislation that created the relief
banks and the “stay laws” which made their
notes quasi-legal tender were of doubtful con-
stitutionality. These laws were challenged vig’
orously in state and federal courts. In Kentucky,
Tennessee and Missouri, these challenges ulti-
mately led to the demise of the relief banks.
Some of the federal court challenges were or-
chestrated by the second Bank of the United
States. In 1816, Congress had responded to fi-
nancial problems created by the War of 1812
by chartering a second U.S. Bank. The new
bank was (again) a private institution, though
the federal government held a sizable minority
interest. ‘the term of its charter was 20 years.”
The U.S. Bank’s charter required its notes to
be strictly convertible. The Bank’s management
believed that it could circulate convertible notes
in the west and south only if the notes of its lo-
cal competitors were also convertible. The man-
agement also believed that acquiring a large
local circulation was essential if the Bank were
to earn a profit on its southern and western
operations, or effectively perform its duties as
the payments agent of the federal government.”
The Bank consequently made strenuous efforts
to force the western banks to return to the
specie standard. This policy allowed it to extend
the scope of its activities in the West, while
striking a pose as the defender of sound curren-
cy. In the meantime, bitter political controversy
over the redistributive implications of the activi-
ties of the Banks of the State greatly reduced
their effectiveness.”
In many ways, the relief banks were direct
descendants of the public land banks that had
been quite successful, and had enjoyed consen~
sus public support, during the years preceding
the Revolution. Unfortunately, the extraordinari-
ly adverse economic circumstances which led
the western states to circumvent the Constitu-
tion by creating these institutions also served to
ensure their ultimate demise. The relief banks
were created by the state legislatures for the
purpose of relieving the financial plight of their
constituents, rather than to provide a sound
currency, or to earn revenue (which is to say
profits) for the states.” This mandate, combined
with the depth of the agrarian distress, made it
impossible for the banks’ managers to resist
making too many loans to troubled farmers—
who were already burdened with debt and
whose ability to repay was very doubtful. The
same circumstances led the states to supplement
the relief bank legislation with stay laws and
related provisions. These provisions made the
banks extremely controversial, earning them the
enmity of creditor interests in general and the
powerful United States Bank in particular.
The failure of the relief bank experiment had
an effect on public attitudes toward monetary
issues that was reminiscent of public reaction to
the Revolutionary hyperinflation. People became
increasingly suspicious of banks and paper’ cur-
“The best available account of the Panic and its aftermath
is Rothbard (1962).
The legislatures of these states enacted “stay laws”
which provided that foreclosures and other legal actions
for the collection of delinquent debts (“executions,” to use
the contemporary description) could be delayed for long
periods—typically a year or more—unless the creditors in
question were willing to accept Bank of the State notes at
par. See Rothbard (1962), chapters II, Ill.
~ on the discounts on the notes of the Kentucky relief
bank are available from Berry (1943) and Sumner (1896).
Fenstermaker (1965a) presents somewhat less complete in-
formation on the discounts on other relief bank currencies.
“See Rothbard (1962), pp. 41-42, 80-83; see also Dowrie
(1913).
“See Catterall (1902), chapter I.
“See Catterall (1902), pp. 96-99. Redlich (1951), pp. 109-10,
124, 128-29, 440-44, Temin (1969), p. 49, and Fraas
(1974).
“For accounts of the demise of the relief systems, see
Rothbard (1962), Chapter Ill, Hammond (1957). pp.
282-285, and Sumner 0896).
“See Fenstermaker (1965a), pp. 26~27, Rothbard (1962),
pp. Bl~B3.85-86, 102-03, and Sumner (1896).
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rency, and increasingly enamored with “hard
money—specie, or bank notes rigidly convert-
ible into specie. The demise of the relief banks
also gave the Bank of the United Slates a virtual
monopoly over banking in much of the West.
The southern states tried a different—and ini-
tially, at least, more promising—experiment
with inconvertible banking. The southern banks,
unlike their western counterparts, were large
but few in number; frequently, they operated
branches across their respective states. The
southern state governments held large minority
interests in these banks. Since the dividends on
the shares provided an important source of
state revenue, the state legislatures had no
desire to see the banks close down.” In addi-
tion, since the financial distress that accompa~
nied the Panic was less severe in the South than
in the West, the popular outcry against the
banks was somewhat less strident there. Finally,
because of their large size and branch systems,
the banks of the region were more effectively
diversified than their western counterparts, and
requirements imposed by their charters had
kept them relatively highly capitalized.
When the southern banks suspended the con-
vertibility of their notes, the governments of the
southern states did not force them to liquidate,
or even to close down. Instead, the banks were
permitted, and often encouraged, to continue to
do business—lending, collecting on loans, and
conducting other financial transactions, all
through the medium of their now-inconvertible
“See note 73 above.
“’For a description of banking in North Carolina after the
suspension, see Russell (19B9a).
“Note discount data forNorth and South Carolinastate banks
during 1817-1 829 are provided by Russell (19B9a).Fenster-
maker (1 965a) provides less complete datafor all the
southern states.
“For expressions of this view see Gouge (1833), Sumner
(1896) and Klein (1974).
“Before thesuspensions, the notes ofsouthern state banks
had traded at or near par with specie; afterwards,they traded
at variable discounts. Thus it seems clear that the suspen-
sions exposed noteholders to risksthey had not previously
borne. The author believes that afterthe suspensions, the
market priced bank notes in much the same manner as
modern mutual fund shares. This sort of pricing scheme
would have linked thevalue of a bank’s notes to thevalue of
its assets—a link which was absent under convertibility. [See
Russell (I9B9b,c).l Othertheories of inconvertiblenote
prtcing have broadly similarimplications, however. The most
popular alternative theory is that the notes of a suspended
bank were priced as riskytitles to future specie, payable if
and when the issuing bank resumed payments.Since the
stateof a bank’s portfolio was probably the biggest single
factorinfluencing theprospect that it would be able to re-
notes.”’ These notes dropped to variable discounts
(against specie) in the open market. Variation in
these discounts seem to have reflected changing
market conditions—much like the variation in
modern national currency exchange rates.”
Economic historians have usually viewed the
suspensions as irregular events completely in-
consistent with the maintenance of monetary
and financial stability.” There are good practi-
cal and theoretical arguments against this view,
however. On a practical level, the banks stayed
in business, and continued to supply badly needed
currency and credit, despite the depressed condi-
tions created by the collapse in prices and the
financial panic. This situation stands in marked
contrast to that of the West. There, the banking
system collapsed, and a scarcity of currency
and credit threatened to bring economic activity
to a standstill.
On a theoretical level, the suspensions shifted
some of the burden of the banks’ portfolio risk
from shareholders to noteholders.” The price
collapse and panic had revealed the true extent
of the risks the banks faced, and had exacer-
bated the already acute scarcity of financial
capital—particularly concentrated financial capi-
tal—in the relatively undeveloped southern
states.” Under these circumstances, it seems
doubtful that current or future bank shareholders
would have been willing to continue to bear all
of the banks’ portfolio risk—particularly in light
of the heavy losses that a prompt return to
specie pa~rnentswould have imposed.”
sume, this theory also impliesthat the holdersof inconvertible
bank notes were bearing portfolio risk.And because all of the
portfolio risk had to be borne bythe holdersof the banks’
liabilities,any riskborne by noteholders reduced the riskborn
by shareholders (and vice-versa).
Another alternative theory is that bank notes traded at a
discount during suspension because holders’ inability to
convert them into specie temporarily reduced their useful-
ness, relative tospecie, asmediaof exchange. Advocates of
this theory typically view suspensions as a sort of “safety
valve” protecting fractional reserve banking systems oper-
ating under /a/ssez-faire—operating without, that is, govern-
ment deposit insurance and/or a government lender of last
resort. For expressionsof this view see Friedman and
Schwartz (1963), pp. 163-68, 324-32, and Dwyer and Gilbert
(1989).
“Thecharters of contemporary banks specified minimum
denominations for shares which were usually well out of
reach of thecommon people. The rationale behind these
minima is notentirely clear. See Russell (1989a), pp. 35-36.
“The North Carolina banks, in particular, decided toclose
down when specie payments were finally imposed on them in
1828-1829. See Russell (1989a), pp. 25-32, 78-80, Holder





















A case can be made that the post-Panic suspen-
sions began aprocess which, had it been allowed
to proceed unhindered, might have enabled the
South to develop an alternative banking system
which was peculiarly suited to its distinctive needs.
Because the southern economy was dominated by
agriculture, banks could be useful to southern
economic development only if they were able to
make farm loans in large volumes. Farm loans,
however, were relatively risky—and under con-
vertibility, these riskswere borne almost exclu-
sively by bank stockholders. These stockholders
had both the opportunity and the means to lend
outside the South, and could be induced to take
these large risks only in return for high average
rates of return. Such rates would have made bank
credit too expensive for many farmers—and usury
laws might have prevented the banks from charging
them in any case. One solution to this problem was
the development of an alternative banking system
which could bring the diffuse financialcapital of
the common people into the risk-bearing process.
Inconvertible privatebanking seems to have had
the potential to provide such a system.”
Unfortunately for the southern banks, both the
federal government and its financial agent, the
Bank ofthe United States, regarded the suspen-
sions with almostunalloyed hostility. The U.S.
‘treasury Department was deeply (and somewhat
irrationally, under the cir-cumstances) committed
to fiscal arrangements under which payments to
the federal government (fortaxes, landpurchases,
etc.) were made exclusively in par currency.”
Southerners, however, were used to making
government payments in local (bank) currency,
which was no longer trading at par. The Bank of
the United States, which was charged with the
responsibility of receiving and clearing the pay-
ments, found itselfwedged very uncomfortably in
between. If the Bank accepted discounted state
bank notes at par for government payments, the
Treasury would insist that it clear them at par,
and the Bank would take large exchange losses. If
it did not accept state bank notes at all, it would at
the very least offend the people of the South—a
region where it greatly desired to extend its busi-
ness—and might well materially increase their
economic troubles. The Bank would also offend
the Treasury, its patron, which wished to ensure
that federal payments could be made in currency
readily available to the public.” Finally, if the
Bank accepted state bank notes at their market
rates of discount, it would be accepting a situation
which, it believed, prevented it from operating
profitably and effectively in the region.”
The Bank’s problems would have been solved if
the southern banks had resumed specie payments
promptly after the Panic. When they did not, it
launched a campaign to force them to do so. It
continued to accept discounted state bank notes in
payment offederal debts and, when it had accu-
mulated them in large quantities, presented them
at the counters of the state banks for payment.
When the southern banks refused to pay, the U.S.
Bankfiled suit against them infederalcourt.”’
While the suspensions had no formal legal validi-
ty—inprinciple, each bank note was redeemable at
par and on demand, and a hank which declined to
redeem its notes had defaulted on its debts—they
were implicitly (and sometimes explicifly) tolerated
by state legislatures and courts. The U.S. Bank, how-
ever, was in a position to sueinfederalcourts, which
provided the state banks no such protection.”
“This argument is presented in detail in Russell (1989a,b).
“It seems likely that the exchange problems described here
could have been avoided if the Treasury had been willing
to accept and disburse state bank notes at their market
rates of discount. A similar situation had arisen after the
general suspension, of specie payments which occurred in
August of 1814, near the end of the War of 1812. During
the months after the suspension, the Treasury needed
funds to service debt held by residents of New England.
New England was the only region of the United States in
which the banks had not suspended specie payments, so
New England bank notes were trading at par with specie.
Unfortunately, most of the federal government’s revenue
was received in the mid-Atlantic region. The mid-Atlantic
banks had suspended, and their notes were trading well
below par. The Treasury insisted on accepting local cur-
rency at par in payments to the federal government, and
on disbursing such currency only where it would be ac-
cepted at par. This forced it into temporary default on its
debt service payments, despite its large balances of mid-
Atlantic bank notes. See Catterall (1902),pp. 4-7, and Ban-
croft (1831), pp. 47-49.
“2For a general description of the U.S. Bank’s problems as
a federal collection and clearing agent, see Catterall
(1902). For accounts of its disputes with the banks of Ge-
orgia and North Carolina, see Govan (1937), Heath (1954),
Holder (1937) and Russell (1989a). These accounts are
based on correspondence between the U.S. Bank, the
Treasury Department, and the state banks that is recorded
in the American State Papers, Finance, Volume 4.
“See note 90 above.
“’Govan (1937) and Russell (l9B9a) describe federal court
suits filed by the U.S. Bank against state banks in Georgia
and North Carolina, respectively.
“See Hammond (1957), pp. 283-84, and Russell (1989a),
pp. 42-43. The efforts of various southern and western
states (notably Georgia) to evade adverse federal court de-
cisions concerning the U.S. Bank were ultimately rejected
bythe U.S. SupremeCourt. See Catterall (1902), pp. 88-91,
Govan (1937), and Hammond (1957), pp. 263-68, 272-73.
FEDERALRESERVE BANKOF St LOUISI 53
The efforts of the U.S. Bank slowly forced the
banks of the various southern states to resume
payments: Virginia and South Carolina in 1823,
Georgia in 1825, Alabama in 1827 and North Caro-
lina in 1823. In view of the conventional wisdom
regarding suspensions, it should come as no sur-
prise that most economic historians haveregarded
the Bank’s resumption campaign as virtuous and
constructive; the Bank is lauded, in particular, for
having created a “uniform national currency.”
Southern farmers, and other southerners whose
livelihood was based, directly or indirectly, on
farming—groups which collectively comprised the
bulk of the region’s population—had less reason to
sing the Bank’s praises. ‘the cost of resumption was
that state banking systems (or those portions of
them which survived) became reluctant to lend to
farmers. Since there were few alternative sources
of credit available, farm loans became substan-
tially more difficult toobtain.” It should thus be
equally unsurprising that, just a few years later,
the southern states were in the forefront of the
opposition to the Bank’s efforts to secure a new
charter.”
A Bank War and the Rise ofFree
Banking
Synopsis: The political controversy that led to
the demise of the Bank ofthe United States had a
profound effect on public attitudes toward the
banking and currency system. The American
public became suspicious of any hint of monopoly
power in banking and of any link between the
federal government andprivate banks. It also
became increasingly devotedto the concept of
hard money. One outgrowth of theseattitudes
was that many states adopted laws providing for
“Free Banking.”Free banking laws encouraged
entry into banking, and resulted in the establish-
ment oflargenumbers of banks. The free banks
were heavily regulated, however; their notes were
to be carefully secured, and strictly convertible.
Other results of changed public attitudes were the
“Specie Circular” and the “Independent Treasury.”
The federal government became reluctantto accept
“See in particular Catterall (1902), Redlich (1951), Ham-
mond (1957) and Temin (1969).
“For the case of North Carolina, see Russell (1989a), pp.
71-74. In 1828, Georgia established the Central Bank, a
state-owned institution designed to extend long-term loans
to farmers and planters. Heath (1954) ascribes this deci-
sion to a shortage of long-term commercial bank credit
that developed during the 1820s.
bank currency in payment, and attempted to
conduct its financial operations without the aid of
banks.
The election of 1828 transferred control over
the federal administration from the Whigs, led by
defeated President John Quincy Adams of Mas-
sachusetts, to the Democrats, led by President-
elect Andrew Jackson of Tennessee. The Demo-
crats regarded themselves as the party of the com-
mon (and thus largely agricultural) people; they
had longbeen advocates of competitive, decentral-
ized state banking and opponents of the Banks of
the United States. The party also contained a hard
money faction which was deeply suspicious of
banking of any kind. Jackson himself seems to
have had somewhat ambiguous feelings toward
banking. On one hand, many of his principal
advisors were men who had defended the relief
banks and bitterly resented the damage the U.S.
Bank had done to the banks and people of the
western states. Some of these men tvere now con-
nected with the state banks, and thus tended to
formulate policies which favored their interests
vls-a-vis those of the U.S. Bank. On the other hand,
Jackson is said to have been personally opposed to
banking and paper currency of any sort; late in his
administration he took actions that greatly in-
creased the problems ofthe state banking
systems.”
Jackson’s State of the Union message in 1829
came out against the recharter of the United
States Bank. (The Bank’s charter did not expire
until 1836, but its friends in Congress had begun
to agitate for an early recharter act.) Jackson
argued that the Bank’s constitutionality was
doubtful, and that its concentrated financial
power was inconsistent with the tenets of
representative democracy. Jackson’s message
marks the beginning of the “Bank War,” a period
of five years or so during which the Whigs (who
controlled Congress) attempted to defend the
Bank against the increasingly vituperative attacks
of the Democratic administration. During this
period, the ‘Bank question” became the single
biggest issue in national politics. The Democrats
“Catterall (1902), pp. 164-65, 235, Hoyt (1960) and Wilburn
(1967), pp. 7-11, 17-19, descrtbe southern support for the
Bank War.
“For descriptions of Jackson’s attitude toward banking in
general, and the United States Bank in particular, see Cat-
terall (1902), pp. 182-85, Schlesinger (1953), pp. 76-78,
Redlich (1951), pp. 162-71, Hammond (1957), pp. 346-50,



















simultaneously exploitedand encouraged public
feeling against the banks so as to build up their
politicalpower base at the Whigs’ expense. After
Jackson was re-elected in 1832 the issue came to a
head; Congress passed legislation rechartering the
Bank, Jackson vetoed the legislation, andCongress
failed (narrowly) to override his veto. The second
U.S. Bank effectively ceased to exist as a national
institutionwhen its federal charter expired in
1836; its relationship with the federal government
had been severed, and its power thus greatly
reduced, two years earlier.”
The demise of the U.S. Bank raised two impor-
tant questions: how should the federal govern-
ment administer its financialaffairs, and how
should the states regulate their banking systems?
The first question arose because the U.S. Bank had
acted as the financial agent for the U.S. Treasury—
in other words, as the federal government’s bank.
The second arose because the U.S. Bank no longer
existed to regulate the state banks and, inparticu-
lar, toenforce specie payments. By the secondhalf
of the 1830s, Jacksonian hard-money notions had
become so pervasive that few people were pre-
pared to accept a return to relatively laissez-
faire banking, or to a currencywhich might
cometo consist largely of inconvertible bank
notes. The effect of the Jackson Administra-
tion’s anti-U.S. Bank campaign on a financially
unsophisticated public had been to exacerbate
its doubts about and suspicion of all banks and
all paper currency.”
The Jackson and Van Buren Administrations
[Martin Van Buren, who was elected president in
1836, had been Jackson’s vice presidentl responded
to the first problem with two policy initiatives.
The first was an executive order called the Specie
Circular, issued in 1838, shortly before Jackson
left office. This order directed the U.S. Treasury
to accept no currency other than specie in pay-
ment of debts to the federal government.” The
secondpolicy initiative was the Independent Trea-
sury Act, a product of the Van Buren Administra-
tion. This Act withdrew the U.S. government’s
cash deposits from the large state banks (some-
times called pet banks) where they had been placed
after the demise ofthe U.S. Bank. Henceforth, the
Treasury would act as its own banker. The net
effect of these two actions was profoundly anti-
banking. The federal government would no longer
deal with the state banks, or encourage (or even
recognize) their note circulation.”
The states’ response to the problem of bank
regulation reflected two features of public atti-
tudes towards banking which had grown out of
the Bank War: suspicion of concentrated financial
power, and preference for “hard money.” Under
the bank chartering system that existed in most
states prior to the late 1830s, the issuance of a
charter required a special act ofthe state legisla-
ture. The process of securing legislative assent
was lengthy, cumbersome, uncertain and occa-
sionally corrupt; in addition, banks that already
possessedcharters generally lobbied vigorously
against the issuance of new ones. The upshotwas
that most states had a relatively small number of
banks, and that these banks possessed, or were
believed to possess, considerable market power.”4
The “free” in the free banking laws reflected the
desire to reform the chartering process in the
direction of free entry. Each state would formu-
latea standardized charter, and any individual or
group which was able and willing to meet the
terms of this charter could organize a bank in that
state. The free banks would be regulated by the
state auditor, or by a state banking agency created
for that purpose; the legislature would be involved
only indirectly. This system was intended to
greatly increase the number of state banks.”
There is another sense in which the term “free
banking” is a misnomer, however. Free banking
was not in any sense laissez-faire or unregulated
banking. The standardized charters imposed
numerous and relatively stringent restrictions on
thebanks’ capitalization and reserves, the condi-
“For accounts of theBank War,see Catterall (1902), Ham-
mond (1957) and Schlesinger (1953), among many others.
“‘Foradescription of the Loco Focos (formally, theEqual
Rights Party), a party ofantibanking radicals which arose
during the Bank War and was ultimately instrumental in the
rise ofFree Banking and theIndependent Treasury, see
Redlich (1951), pp. 188-90, Hammond (1957), pp. 493-99,
and Schlesinger (1953), chapters XV-XVI.
“For analysesof the motivation behind, and/orthe impact of,
the Specie Circular, see Hammond (1957), pp. 455-57,
Schlesinger(1953), pp. 129-31,Smith (1953), p. 185, Temin
(1969), pp. 120-28, Timberlake (1960) and Timberlake(1978),
chapters.
‘“For discussions of the role of the Independent Treasurysee
Hammond (1957), pp. 542-45, Taus (1943) and Timberlake
(1978), chapter 6.
“4See Hammond (1963),pp. 7-B, (1957), pp. 577-80, Redlich
(1951), pp. 188-90, and Schlesinger (1953), p. 286.
“For discussions of therationale behind Free Bankingsee
Redlich (1951), pp. 187-204, and Hammond (1957), pp.
572-80.





tions under which they could issue notes, and the
types of assets they could hold. Theserestrictions
were designed, in the “hard money” spirit, to ensure
that the banks’ notes would alwaysbe convertible
on demand, and that they would be relatively
immune from losses associated with declines in
the value of the banks’ assets. One restriction was
socommon that it has come to be regarded as
characteristic of free banking: the notes of the
free banks had to be 100 percent backed byhold-
ings of state or federal government securities.”
Freebanking experienced someproblems, espe-
cially during its earlyyears. It seems in particular
to have been characterized by a relatively high
rate of bank failures. These failures, and a few
notorious instances of fraud, have given the sys-
tem a bad reputation amonghistorians.” There
were also many complaints that the need to keep
track of the market values of the many different
types of bank notes in circulation—some of which
were counterfeit or issued by failed or insolvent
banks—materially reduced the effectiveness of
bank currency as a medium of exchange.”
Recent research has revealed that the losses to
noteholders associated with free bank failures
were actually quite small on average.” Ironically
enough, many of the losses and failures that did
occur were caused by defaults on state govern-
ment bonds, which were widespread during the
1840s and 1850s.” Entrepreneurs responded to
the diversity of bank currencies by publishing
“bank note reporters” in which the value of
different bank currencies were recorded, insol-
vent banks identified, and the appearance of
common counterfeits described.” The system
worked well enough that, until the Civil War
broke out, there seems to have been little political
support for any federally dominated alternative.
Additional evidence that contemporary legislators
viewed free banking as viable is provided by the
fact that new states continued to adopt free
banking laws through the early 1860s. Rockoff
(1975)notes that “on the eve of the Civil War over
half the states, including the most populous states,
had free banking laws.”
The Civil Warand the Demise of
State Bank Currency
Synopsis: The changes in the American cur-
rency system produced by the Civil War were
almost as profound as those produced by the Rev-
olutionary War. When the Civil War began, the
U.S. had arelatively decentralized system in which
paper currency was issued by state-chartered and
-regulated banks; the federal government had no
role in the provision of paper money and there
seemed littleprospect that it would acquire one.
When the war ended, the nation had a relatively
centralized system in which paper currency was
issued by federally chartered and regulated banks;
it was no longer possiblefor statebanks to issue
paper money. In addition, the federal government
had acquired and used the power toissue paper
money and to make it legal tender. This huge,
rapid transformation was possible for two rea-
sons. First, the war produced a dramatic shift in
the balance of power between the major political
parties, and between state and federal govern-
ments. Second, the war produced an unprece-
dented need for federal government revenue.
The demise of free banking, and more broadly
ofthe system ofdecentralized, state-regulated
provision of currency, was caused less by any
problems this system may have experienced than
by the outbreak of the U.S. Civil War. This extra-
ordinary political event created a pair of peculiar



















“See Rockoff(1975), pp. 2, 81-87, and Rolnick and Weber
(1984), (1988).
“For unsympathetic descriptions ofthe record of Free
Banking, or references to such descriptions, seeCagan
(1963), pp. 19-21, Friedman (1960), p.6, Hammond (1957),
pp. 723, 741-42, (1963), Rockoff(1975), pp. i-u, and Rolnick
and Weber (1983).
“See Cagan (1963), pp. 19-20, Hammond (1957), pp. 722-23,
(1963), p. 14, and Rockoff (1975), pp. 26-29.
“Rockoff (1975) and Rolnickand Weber (1983, 1988) use data
drawn from state auditors’ reports toprovide careful esti-
matesof the costs offree bankfailures. Rockoffestimates
that the total losses endured by freebank noteholders from
1836 through 1860 wereless than $2 million—about thecost,
in 1860, of a single year of 2 percent inflation. The estimates
provided by Rolnick and Weber are slightly higher (seetheir
1983 paper, p. 1089). Cagan (1963),by contrast, reports with
apparent endorsement an estimate by Jay Cooke that the
losses were $50 million per year. Cagan’s useof this esti-
mate in his influential articleserved to reinforce theconven-
tional view that freebanking was a national disaster.
‘2’See Rockoff (1975) and Rolnick and Weber
(1982,1983,1984,1985,1988).
“See Hammond (1963), p. 14, Temin (1969), p. 50, and




evolution of the U.S. currency and banking sys-
tem. The first was that itgavethe Republican
party, the political successor of the old Whig party,
almost complete control over the federal govern-
ment. The majority ofthe Democratic congress-
men andsenators were southerners who abandoned
their seats and defected to the Confederacy at the
outbreak of hostilities. Since the Republicans had
inherited from theWhigs a preference for mone-
tary and financialcentralization, while the Demo-
crats remained theparty of decentralization, the
defection of the Democrats greatly increased the
prospects for centralizing change in the monetary
system.
The second determining circumstance was the
federal government’s need for enormous new
sources of revenue. Though taxes played some
role in Civil War finance, particularly in the war’s
later years, it was clear almost from the beginning
that the bulk of the expenditure burden would be
met by borrowing.” As the war’scost mounted,
however, the federal government began toexperi-
ence difficulty obtainingthe sums required on the
open securities market, and turned for assistance
to the large Eastern banks.”~ Unfortunately, the
sum required by the governmentfar exceeded the
banks’ aggregate specie holdings; when the specie
borrowed by the government failed for various
reason toreturn to the banks as rapidly as they
had anticipated, they were forced to suspend spe-
cie payments.” The suspension seemed to close
off the possibility offurther bank loans, leaving
the federal government desperate for new sources
offunds and for new- -ays to increase the demand
for its debt.
One way inwhich the government might “bor-
row”was by issuing paper currency. Early in 1882,
at the urging of Secretary of the Tr-easury Salmon
P. Chase, Congress passedthe fix-st Legal Tender
Act. The Act authorized the Treasury Department
to issue $300 millionin paper currency.” This
currency was not convertible in specie, nor re-
deemable in specie at any fixed future date; it was,
however, made legal tender in payment of public
and privatedebts.” Later inthe war, consider-
able additional quantities of these greenbacks
were issued.
The LegalTender Acts markedthe first time in
(post-revolutionary) U.S. history that the federal
government had issued fiat currency—currency
which was entirely irredeemable, and was legal
tender for private debts. The Constitution did not
give the federal government any explicitright to
issue paper currency (fiat or otherwise), or to
make paper currency legal tender; indeed, itcon-
tained language which was widely interpreted as
implicitly denying the government these rights.”
This made the legality ofthe Acts seem very
doubtful. Inthe event, however, no attempt to
challenge them managed to reach the Supreme
Court until several years after the Civil War had
ended. There ensued one of the morebizarre
episodes in U.S. monetary history. Chase, who was
now Chief Justice, voted with the court majority
to strike down legislation whose form he had ap-
proved, and whose passage he had recommended,
when he was Secretary of the Treasury! The
greenbacks were saved when Congress, which
remained dominated by the Republicans, voted to
increase the number of Supreme Court justices by
two; President Grant acted quickly to fill the re-
sulting vacancieswith judges who supported the
Acts’ constitutionality. The enlarged courtvoted
5-4, withChase dissenting, touphold the Acts.”
‘I’his decision set a precedent that was later used
to justify further steps on the part of the federal
government to regulate or control the currency
“For the government’s reluctance to raise taxes during the
early years of the war, see Mitchell (1903), pp.16-19, p. 37,
pp. 72-73.
~ federalgovernment’s financing problems were greatly
exacerbated by its reluctance to sell its securities, which typi-
cally returned interest at the rate of 6 percent of face value, at
a discount—its reluctance, that is, to borrow atinterest rates
in excess of 6 percent. See Mitchell (1903), pp. 48-50, 64-65.
‘2’For accounts ofthesuspension seeMitchell (1903), pp. 37-43
and Hammond (1970), pp. 150-59.
“The provisionsof thefirst and the two subsequent Legal
Tender Act(s) are summarized byMitchell (1903), pp. 44-118.
“In 1875, 10 years after the end of the war, Congress enacted
legislation making the greenbacks convertible in specie,
according to theprewar definition of the dollar, beginning in
1879. This legislation became known, somewhat mislead-
ingly, as the ‘‘Resumption Act.” [The history and provisions
of the Resumption Act are summarized byFriedman and
Schwartz (1963),pp. 44-50.See alsoTimberlake (1978),
chapter 8.1
“For discussions of the constitutionality of legal tender federal
currency, see Breckinridge (1903), pp. 114-37, Mitchell
(1903), pp. 51-55, Hurst(1970), pp.182-86, Christainsen
(1988), Timberlake(1989), (1991). chapters 8-10.
“See Breckinridge (1903), pp. 127-137, Friedman and
Schwartz (1963),pp. 46-47, Mitchell (1903), pp. 71-74, and
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system—notably, the creation of the Federal
Reserve System.
The greenbacks marked a change in the U.S.
currency system which went beyond government
issuance of currency. As has already been noted,
the fiscal crisis of late 1861 caused the private
banking system to suspend specie payments. On
earlier occasions when there had been a national
or regional suspension, most of the surviving
banks had refused to redeem their notes in any
way until they could resume redeeming them in
specie on demand. The fact that the greenbacks
were legal tender, however, gave bank debtors
the legal right to use them to repay their debts.
Since greenbacks began trading at substantial
discounts shortly after they were first issued,
moreover, debtors hastened totake advantage of
this opportunity. Thebanks consequently felt enti-
tled, and indeed compelled, toredeem their notes
ingreenbacks.”°Thereafter, the banking system
redeemed its notes and deposits almost exclusively
in legal tender paper currency, regardless of
whether it was convertible in specie. This ensured
that goods and assets would be priced in legal
tender paper—in other words, that government
currencywould replace specie asthe nation’s unit
of account.
Because neither Congress nor the Administra-
tion was willing to risk a repetition of theRevolu-
tionary hyperinflation, greenbacks could be used
to finance at most a small portion ofthe wartime
deficit.” The balance of the deficit had to be
financed by the issuance ofconventional, interest-
bearing debt.” Secretary Chase responded to this
situation by developing a strategy for monetary
reform which promised to simultaneously achieve
both cur’rency centralization and debt demand
enhancement. This program, which was ultimate-
lyembodied in the National Banking Act, called
for the creation of a “National Banking System”
(NBS)—a system ofprivate, federally chartered
banks which would he nationally regulated ana-
logues of the state-chartered “free banks.” The Act
imposed reserve, capital, convertibility and other
requirements that were generally similar to those
“See Mitchell (1903), pp. 144-49.
“The limited financial resourcesof the southern states made it
difficult for the Confederate government to borrowlarge
sums. As a result, it was forced to cover a very substantial
fraction of its deficit through currency creation. This strategy
ultimately produced a hyperinflation. See Lerner (1956), and
Timberlake (1978), pp. 102-03.
“Mitchell (1903), pp.119-al, discusses the reasons thefederal
government issued no greenbacks from 1863 to the end of
the Civil War.
imposed on the free banks. These requirements
were to be administered, and the national banks
regulated, by a new federal agency calledthe
Office of the Comptroller ofthe Currency.” For
thefirst time in U.S. history, the federal govern-
ment had moved to create a system of private
banks (rather than a single, centrally administered
private bank) under its direct regulatory control.
From the perspective ofthe currency system,
the key features of the National Bank Act involved
the notes the national banks were to issue. These
notes were to be printed by the Treasury Depart-
ment and issued to the banks) rather than printed
by the banks directly; they were to look entirely
uniform, except for an indication of the identity of
the issuer. In order to obtain a given value of bank
notes, a national bank had to deposit U.S. govern-
ment securities of essentially equal value (state
government securities wouldnot do) with the
Comptroller of the Currency. Thus, national bank
notes were to be 100 percent backed by U.S. gov-
ernment securities.
The requirement that the notes be backed by
federal government securities was designed to
create a “captive” demand for federal debt on the
part of banks of issue. Since notes were the prin-
cipal liabilities of contemporary banks, and since
the framers ofthe Act evidently expectedmost of
the state banks to apply for federal charters, there
was every reason to expect that the Act would
force the banking system topurchase Treasury
securities in large quantities. This, it was hoped,
would materially ease the federal government’s
borrowing problems.”
Congress, anticipating heavy demand for nation-
al bank notes, included provisions in theAct estab-
lishing a maximum quantity which could be
issued and allocating this quantity across the
various regions.” Contrary to expectation, how-
ever, during the year or so after the Act was passed
the number of charter applications was small,
and the volume of U.S. bonds deposited as note
backing was far lower than anticipated. Congress
“For thehistory and provisions of the National BankingAct,
see Redlich (1951), pp.99-113 and Hammond (1970),
chapters 10-11.
“Discussionsof thebudgetary motivations for the National
Banking Act can be found in Hammond (1957), p. 725,
(1970), pp. 135-36, 286-95, and Mitchell (1903), pp. 37,
44-45,103,109,





















responded by amending the Act to impose a puni-
tive tax onstate bank notes—a tax rate sohigh (10
percent) that it made note issue by state banks
entirely unprofitable.” This decision eliminated
state bank notes from circulation, and marked the
final demise of state currency systems.
Of course, a system under which any currency
that was notissued directly by thefederal govern-
ment was printed by the federal government, fully
backed by U.S. Treasury securities, and issued in
quantities and locations closely regulated by the
government, might be said to have differed very
little from a system under which the federal gov-
ernment directly issued all papercurrency.”
Indeed, it could be argued that the only really
significant differences between the NBS and a
direct note issuesystem werethat under the NBS,
the government (1) had little short-run influence
over the total quantity of notes (which indeed
proved relatively unresponsive toshort-run influ-
ences of anykind), and (2) assigned the responsi-
bility for clearing the notes (andthus for ensuring
their convertibility in specie) to the issuing banks.
When 50 years of experience with the system
seemed to suggest that these features were serious
liabilities, the federal government used the broad
monetary powers it had acquired during the Civil
War to establish a system of direct issue—the Fed-
eral Reserve System.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The changes in the U.S. currency system that
resulted fromthe Legal Tender and National Bank-
ing acts stand, alongwith the monetary clauses of
the U.S. Constitution, as classic examples of cases
in which the basic structure of the system was
strongly influenced by extraordinary political
events with largely non-economic (or at least, non-
monetary) causes. If, as we have seen, the American
colonies could have obtained their independence
from Great Britain without fighting a long,expensive
and divisive revolutionary war, the monetary his-
tory of the next 90 years might have been very
different: historical evidence suggests that the
states might have retained the right to issue their
own currencies, and that these currencies might
not have been convertible in specie. Subsequently,
ifthe American states could have resolved their
sectional disputes without fighting along, expen-
sive and divisive civilwar, the monetary history of
theensuing 50 years might also have been very
different: historical evidence suggests that the
states might have retained the rightto charter
banks of issue, and that the federal government’s
role inthe U.S. currency system might have
remained relatively limited.
It should also be remembered that the federal
government chartered the second United States
Bankin response to financial dislocations associated
withthe War of 1812.”’ In the absence of Second
Bank opposition, the inconvertible banking sys-
tems that arose in the western and southern states
afterthe Panic of 1819 might have survived and
become entrenched; without a Second Bank for
the Jacksonians to fight, the “hard money” prin-
ciples ofthe Free BankingEra might never have
become popular. Here again a sequence ofessen-
tially political disputes playeda key role in dictat-
ing the evolution of U.S. currency arrangements.”
Currency System Evolution: An
Alternative View
As we have seen, U.S. monetary history has
been punctuated by a sequence ofrather abrupt
transitions from one currency system to another
with very different features. These transitions are
often interpreted as part of a process of Darwinian
advancement—a process, that is, through which
oldand relatively inefficient systems were replaced
by newand more efficient successors. The modern
currency system emerged out of this process as
the mostefficient system yet devised.
While this historicalinterpretation certainly
sounds plausible, it is one that we should accept or
reject on the basis ofevidence concerning the rela-
tive efficiency of past and present currency sys-
tems. Unfortunately, the prestige of Darwinism
“See Friedman and Schwartz (1963), pp. 18-19, Hammond
(1957), pp. 732-34, and Redlich (1951), p. 113.
“This point is made byFriedman and Schwartz (1963), p. 21.
“5ee note 89 above.
“Redlich (1951) comments that had Secretary Chase
promoted the National BankingAct less vigorously, theearly
I
Civil War suspension also might have led to thedevelopment
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has become so great that economists tend to
reverse the logical process by using the various
systems’ orders in the historical sequence as the
basis fox’ efficiency comparisons. (Ifonlythe fittest
systems survive, then the systems that survived at
each stage must have been the fittest.) The disap-
peararice of older systems is regarded as compel-
ling evidence that they wem’e less efficient than
their successors.
The claim that the currency system, if left to
itself, tends to progress (slowly) in the direction of
greater efficiency is not disputed inthis article;
indeed, several examples of this sort of progres-
sion havebeen presented above. What the article
has argued is that the U.S. currency system has
not been left to itself, and that its evolution has
been anything but an orderly and inevitable
progression toward economic efficiency. Instead,
it has been donunated by political decisions that
were largely uninfluenced by efficiency consider-
ations. Many of these decisions wem’e made in
response to political pressures of a particularly
urgent sort—pressures gm’owing out of the U.S.
government’s (and earlier, the British and/or
colonial governments’) involvement in prolonged
and expensive wars.
It is, of course, possiblethat we havebeen
fortunate, and that the politicalprocess has given
us a currency system that is very efficient, or at
least more efficient than the historical alterna-
tives. It is also possible that we have not been quite
sofortunate; the question is a complexone, and
cannot be answeredhere. Thisarticle is content to
point out that the modern currency system has
not developed becauseof any clearadvantage in
efficiency. The possibilitythat history provides
attractive alternatives cannot be ruled out, and the
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